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INTRODUCTION

In 1953, Norm Larsen, a self-taught chemist and founder of the Rocket
Chemical Company, was attempting to develop a chemical that would fortify
metal against rust. On his fortieth attempt, he created a chemical that
displaced the standing water that slowly corrodes metal. He named his
invention "Water Displacement, Fortieth Attempt." Larsen immediately
commercialized his invention, selling it to the U.S. government to protect the
outer skin of the Atas missile from rust and corrosion. Five years after
Larsen developed his chemical product he began offering it to the American
consumer. Water Displacement, Fortieth Attempt was a resounding
commercial success due to the product's affordability and wide range of
common household uses. Today, over eighty percent of American
households own Larsen's product, now known as WD-40.
Larsen never patented WD-40. Instead, Larsen's company, the Rocket
Chemical Company (later renamed the WD-40 Company) relied on trade
2
secrecy to protect its intellectual property. Although other companies have
since created water-displacement chemicals that are similar, if not identical,

1. U.S. Patent No. 6,315,152 (filed Nov. 13, 2001) (retelling the Norm Larsen story as
background for a patent application for a tube storage device).

2. Douglas Martin, John S. Barry, Main ForceBehind WD-40, Dies at 84, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 2009, at B12.
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to the chemical Larsen created, WD-40 continues to enjoy commercial
success across the world.
The success story of the unpatented WD-40 formula runs counter to
traditional conceptualizations of patent law's role in promoting innovation.
Patents are often conceptualized as a means of luring secret inventions out of
the dark, shadowy cave of trade secrecy, and into the bright, public sunlight
of the patent system.4 Courts tend to characterize the preference for patents
over trade secrets as a matter of sound public policy, but this understanding
is both incomplete and under-theorized.s
Reliance upon trade secrecy, it is thought, leaves the know-how
surrounding valuable inventions in the hands of a select few. The traditional
quid pro quo view of the patent system imagines the patent grant as the
carrot used to entice inventors to reveal their valuable secrets to the public.
Secrecy, as conceptualized by the traditional patent quid pro quo viewpoint,
is antithetical to the purposes animating the patent system.
The rhetoric used by courts to describe the patent system as discouraging
secrecy pervades certain patent doctrines as well. Various patent doctrines
attempt to persuade inventors to forego secrecy by favoring patentees over
trade secret holders in various potential disputes. For example, a first
inventor who relies on trade secrecy risks losing the right to practice her own
invention if a subsequent inventor chooses to patent the invention.! Other
legal doctrines close the proverbial doors of the patent office to inventors

3. Gwendolyn Bounds, Boss Talk: No More Squeaking By-WD-40 CEO Gart Ridge
Repackages a Core Product, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2006, at B1 (claiming that the WD-40
company sells over one million cans per week).
4. See generally Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (describing the
patent "quid pro quo" which seeks to encourage inventors to reveal their discoveries via the
patent system).
5. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, 96 AM. ECON. REV., no. 2, 2006, at 92, 95
("The effects of encouraging inventors to adopt trade secret versus patent protection are not
well understood. Further work is needed to compare the ... costs that result from inducing
some inventors to seek trade secret rather than patent protection.").
6. Gordon L. Doerfer, The Limits of Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and
Antitrust Supremag, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1432, 1441 (1967); Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising
Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 314 (2008) ("[T]he law
operates in various ways to encourage inventors to choose patent over trade secret
protection where both are possible."); Jason Mazzone & Matthew Moore, The Secret Life of
Patents, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 33, 35 (2008) ("Federal law . . . expresses a clear preference for
the inventor who discloses an invention to the public and obtains a patent over the inventor
who keeps the invention a secret."); Shapiro, supra note 5, at 95 ("[The current patent
system rewards applicants who are most aggressive in seeking patents over those who simply
use their own inventions internally as trade secrets.").
7. See, e.g., Gillman v. Stern, 114 F.2d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1940).
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who file for a patent more than one year after commercialization.! These
doctrines are designed to convince inventors to seek patent protection for
their inventions at an early stage in the inventive process, rather than to
continue working in secret.
Despite the traditional distaste for secrecy displayed by patent law,
secrecy offers several underappreciated benefits. First, secret inventions
reduce the administrative and judicial burdens associated with patenting. The
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) cannot keep up with the over
500,000 patent applications filed each year.' Similarly, patent litigation has
become an enormously expensive and time-consuming affair, resulting in the
creation of an entirely new circuit court of appeals to handle patent appeals."
Reliance upon trade secrecy does not involve the expensive administrative
and judicial procedures that patent protection entails.
Second, the use of trade secrets does not reduce competition for
innovation, as the use of patents does. Unlike a patented invention, a secret
invention does not limit competitors from independently discovering or
reverse engineering the invention. The unfettered competition that trade
secrecy permits attracts competitors to the most successful and profitable
inventive spaces. Patents, on the other hand, can discourage inventors from
entering into well-researched areas. While the increased competition for
innovation may result in duplicative research, the social benefits that come
from innovative competition may outweigh the costs of duplication,
particularly when research costs are small."
Trade secrecy's competitive benefits extend to the realm of
commercialization and development as well. Trade secret exclusivity has an
uncertain duration. The potential loss of exclusivity can motivate inventors to
rapidly commercialize, develop, and improve their invention. Patentees, on
the other hand, may not be as diligent in commercializing due to the patent's
relative security from competitors. 2
Lastly, the availability of secrecy can increase the ex ante incentive to
invent in certain cases. Some inventions (such as inventive manufacturing
8. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), (g) (2007).
9. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S. Patent Statistics,
Calendar Years 1963-2010 (Mar. 2011), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/
taf/us-stat.pdf [hereinafter PTO, U.S. Patent Statistics] (recording 520,277 U.S. patent
applications filed in 2010).
10. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts,
64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 6 (1989) (stating that the Federal Circuit was created partially as a result
of the caseload crisis at the federal courts).
11. See infra Part III.
12. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents,62 STAN. L. REv. 341, 358 (2010).
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and chemical methods) are more valuable to their inventors as secrets than
those inventions would be as patents. This increased value is due to the
avoided costs of patenting (the cost of obtaining and enforcing patent rights)
as well as the potential private benefits of secrecy (primarily the potential
duration of exclusivity and the ability to conceal their invention from
competitors). Secrecy can thus increase an invention's private value as
compared to the same invention if patented; increased private value increases
the ex ante incentives to create.' 3
In light of the social benefits of secret inventions, this Article argues that
trade secrets and patents should be viewed not as opposing systems of
invention protection, but rather as complementary tools for policy makers.
Along those lines, the Article constructs a framework for determining when
policy makers should prefer patents to secrets, and vice versa. The
framework is modeled upon the patent reward theory, which explains the
existence of the patent system as a means of overcoming the public goods
problem of economics. By employing the reward theory model and
introducing the concept of differing inventive value for patented and secret
inventions, the framework suggests situations in which an inventor's
protection preference differs from society's preference.

The framework concludes that policy makers ought not to discourage
secrecy, as the law currently does. Because secrecy is a market inefficiency
that (at times) permits inventors to amortize their investment costs, there is
no risk of reduced innovation when inventors choose trade secret protection:
inventor choice of protection scheme is the best means of eliminating the
free rider problem. Furthermore, in light of the societal costs of patenting,
the law should actually encourage secrecy over patenting in certain
circumstances. By encouraging secrecy in certain cases, policy makers can
better balance the innovation incentives of the patent system.
This Article proposes two categories of doctrinal changes in light of the
constructed framework. First, the Article urges the elimination of patent
doctrines that discourage the use of secrecy. The adoption of prior user
rights is recommended, along with changes to the standards used in patent
priority disputes. Second, this Article begins to examine potential ways in
which the law can actively encourage the use of secrecy. A potential
limitation of patent subject matter is examined. Additionally, this Article
13. See Mark A. Lemley, Properoy, Intellectual Propery, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1054 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, Free Riding] ("In a private market economy,
individuals will not generally invest in invention or creation unless the expected return from
doing so exceeds the cost of doing so-that is, unless they can reasonably expect to make a
profit from the endeavor.").
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proposes the creation of a secret invention registry. The registry would
encourage the use of secrecy by lowering the private cost of enforcing trade
secret rights.
II.

PATENT LAW AND SECRECY

Innovators encounter a diverse array of legal means to appropriate their
innovations. 14 Patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets offer
different legal protection mechanisms for different types of inventions,
works, or commercial marks. Some innovations can only be protected by one
form of intellectual property." The Nike "swoosh," for example, is
protectable only as a trademark. An artistic work, such as Gone with the Wind,
is protected under copyright law but cannot be patented." Some innovative
subject matter falls within the ambit of multiple protection regimes. For
example, software can often be protected with a utility patent, a copyright, or
both. Ornamental designs, such as designer candle holders, can be patented
(by a design patent), copyrighted, and/or trademarked."
While the overlap between copyright and patent at times permits two
forms of protection, there is one intellectual property overlap that requires an

14. Of course, intellectual property protection is not required when innovation occurs.
Alternatively, an innovator may decide to forgo legal protection for her invention and
instead disclose her innovation to the public free of charge. Such disclosure may occur for
numerous reasons, including enhanced professional reputation, conformity to common
industry or community norms, or because of lack of earning potential associated with the
innovation. The social and private benefits of voluntary disclosure are outside the scope of
this article. For more on open disclosure's benefits for peer production, see generally Yochai
Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (arguing
that open source production models are superior to hierarchical models of production
because of open source's more efficient acquisition and processing of human capital
availability).
15. This assumes that trade secrets are considered intellectual property, a proposition
that has received substantial attention and criticism. For more on trade secrecy's place in the
intellectual property universe, see generally Lemley, supra note 6 (arguing that trade secrets
should be considered forms of intellectual property); Michael Risch, Wby Do We Have Trade
Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1 (2007) (arguing that trade secrets are not
intellectual property because the justification for trade secret law is not based on incentives
to invent).
16. Although there are now patent applications for movie plot lines pending at the
PTO, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bilski v. Kappos likely dooms those applications
as unpatentable "abstract ideas." Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (holding a method
of hedging risk unpatentable as an abstract idea).
17. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (MPEP) 5 1512.1 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010) ("There is an
area of overlap between copyright and design patent statutes where the author/inventor can
secure both a copyright and a design patent.").
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innovator to choose between protection schemes: that of trade secret and
patent law.'" An innovator who chooses to patent cannot simultaneously
enjoy trade secrecy because the patent application reveals her secret to the
world.' 9 Similarly, the choice to maintain an invention as a long-term secret
precludes patenting that invention.20 Thus, since the law precludes inventors
from receiving simultaneous patent and trade secret protection, an inventor
must select the regime that provides the best protection for the particularities
of her invention.2'
A.

PATENTS AND TRADE SECRETS: LEGAL DIFFERENCES

An invention is eligible for patenting at the moment it is "reduced to
practice" or when an inventor produces descriptions of the invention that
enable a skilled artisan to practice the invention. 22 "Reduction to practice"
can occur in one of two ways: constructive (which occurs upon filing a
patent application) or actual.2 3 Actual reduction to practice requires that an
invention work for its intended purpose.2 4 When an invention is ready for
patenting, an inventor can choose to patent or to continue working in secret.
The window for patenting ends one year after the innovation has been
commercialized or used publicly. 25

18. Compare Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1974) (discussing
selection of patenting or secrecy), with In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1395-96 (C.C.P.A. 1974)
(holding that the constitutional provision distinguishing copyrights and patents does not
"require[] an election" of one form of protection over the other).
19. There is a delay between the filing of a patent application and the publication
thereof during which an invention may be considered both patented and secret. Secrecy in
this case expires upon publication, which typically occurs eighteen months after filing. 35
U.S.C. § 122(a)-(b)(1)(A) (2006).
20. Id. 5 102(b) (2006).
21. It should be noted that the choice presented so far is somewhat stylized. The
literature reveals that the choice between patent and secrecy is often not an all-or-nothing
choice. See Karl F. Jorda, Patent and Trade Secret Complementariness:An Unsuspected Synergy, 48
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 31 (2009). Inventors often will employ a hybrid strategy in protecting
their invention in which they patent some aspects of their invention and maintain other
aspects as trade secrets. This strategy provides some of the benefits of both protection
schemes. For instance, patent infringement suits are available as a remedy, yet the risk of free
riding from the patent document itself is reduced due to the presence of the trade secret.
Part IV, infra, deals with this hybrid strategy in more detail.
22. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998).
23. Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
24. Id.
25. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Similarly, an invention is ineligible for patent protection one
year after the invention appears in a qualifying publication.
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In making the patent/trade secret election, inventors must consider the
different scope and strength of protection offered by the two regimes.2 6 The
legal protection offered by a patent differs from that offered by trade secrecy
in four fundamental ways. First, a trade secret has a potentially limitless
lifespan, while a patent is constitutionally time-limited. The Constitution
requires that patents be granted "for a limited term." 27 Currently, the right to
exclude that a patent provides can extend for up to twenty years. Trade
secrets, on the other hand, allow inventors to exclude others for as long as
secrecy continues.
The most famous example of trade secrecy's duration is the formula for
Coca-Cola syrup. The Coca-Cola Company protects the formula for Coke as
a trade secret, and it has been doing so for over a century. 28 Had the
company instead chosen to patent the formula it would have been forced to
disclose the secret to the world and been unable to exclude others from
copying that formula over the past eighty years.29
However, the potentially limitless life of a trade secret comes with a risk.
The second fundamental difference between patent and trade secret
protection is that a secret invention has a narrower exclusionary scope. A
patent permits a patentee to exclude any unauthorized use of the invention,
even if the invention was independently developed.30 A trade secret, on the
other hand, only provides a legal remedy against misappropriation of the
secret.3' Secret inventions risk discovery through independent invention or
26. This Article is concerned only with those innovations that are potentially
patentable. Trade secret law's subject matter is more inclusive than patent law. A trade secret
can encompass information that is neither new nor non-obvious and is therefore ineligible
for patent protection. See, e.g., Risch, supra note 15, at 11, 12 (citing 35 U.S.C. 55 101-103
(2000)). Similarly, unoriginal information-such as names and phone numbers--can be
protected as a trade secret but is not eligible for patent protection. Id. at 12. This Article is
concerned with only the subset of potential trade secrets that would also be eligible for
patent protection.
27. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
28. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288 (D. Del. 1985)
(mentioning that the trade secret 7X formula was kept in bank vault that could only be
accessed by a board resolution).
29. Other famous culinary trade secrets include Colonel Sanders' original recipe for
fried chicken and McDonald's original special sauce. Many of these trade secrets would not
be eligible for patent or copyright protection because recipes are ineligible for any sort of
intellectual property protection. See, e.g., Emily Cunningham, Protecting Cuisine Under the Rubric
of IntellectualPropert Law: Should the Law Play a Bigger Role in the Kitchen?, 9 J. HIGH TECH. L. 21
(2009) (noting that any intellectual property protection for methods of food preparation is
unlikely to be used, although patent law is arguably available).
30. See, e.g., Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to PatentInfringement, 105
MICH. L. REv. 475, 480 (2006) (arguing for an independent inventor defense in patent law).
31. Id.
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reverse engineering.3 2 Thus, if one were to independently stumble upon the
secret Coke formula, or if one were to reverse engineer the formula via
chemical testing, nothing prevents the discoverer from commercializing that
formula.
The third fundamental difference in the protection regimes is that a
secret invention requires no legal formalities to obtain exclusionary rights."
Filing for a patent involves a lengthy, expensive process. Patent attorneys
draft stylized legal documents that are required to describe the metes and
bounds of the patent, disclose the invention in a way that permits a "person
skilled in the art to make and use the invention without undue
experimentation," 34 and demonstrate that the invention is novel, nonobvious, and useful.35 The attorney then files the document with the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office. The initial filings are often rejected,
necessitating amendments to the original filings in the form of a
continuation, further filings demonstrating the patentability of the invention,
or other negotiations with the patent office.36 This cycle can continue ad
infinitum. Patents cost upwards of $10,000 to file and are expensive to
maintain.
Trade secrets, on the other hand, require no formal registration with the
government.38 nstead, trade secret protection requires owners to invest in
"reasonable measures" to keep the secret. 39 Thus, secret inventions require a
measure of self-help in order to exclude. By choosing secrecy, inventors
avoid the cost of obtaining a patent and the risky, costly business of patent
enforcement. Patent litigation is an extremely costly undertaking and requires
patent holders to monitor competitors for infringement, which can be quite
costly and difficult depending on the visibility of the invention.40 However,
trade secrets carry their own set of costs: negotiations and relationships must

32. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmts. 1-2 (amended 1985).

33. Id. § 1 (listing the requirements for a trade secret).
34. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
35. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.
36. See CRAIG A. NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS, 41-42 (2d ed. 2011) (explaining the
typical process of obtaining patent rights).
37. Mark A. Lemley, RationalIgnorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 14981500 (2001) (estimating 2001 costs).
38. See UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT § 1 (listing the requirements for a trade secret).
39.

See ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS

§§

1.03-.04 (1996).

40. Upwards of $7 billion was spent on legal fees surrounding patent litigation and
patent prosecution in 2001. Lemley, supra note 37, at 1498-1503.
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be closely monitored and controlled through non-disclosure agreements,
employee confidentiality agreements, and physical protection.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly for innovation policy, trade secrets
differ from patented inventions in the amount of disclosure that is legally
required (or permitted) to protect an invention. A secret, by its nature,
cannot be broadly disclosed. Once a trade secret is widely known, it no
longer qualifies for legal protection.4 2 Conversely, a patented invention must
be fully disclosed to the public. The patent document itself must "enable" a
skilled artisan to practice the invention.
Oftentimes an inventor will desire disclosure, either through a patent or a
published article. But at other times an inventor may wish to keep her
invention secret, either to maximize profit, minimize competition, or to
conduct further research and development before choosing whether to
disclose. However, such secrecy is not always feasible." Often, disclosure of
an invention is tied to commercialization. For example, an improved pop-top
soda can is effectively disclosed once on the market; secrecy of the
commercialized product is virtually impossible.
Secrecy is often used by inventors as a means of appropriating an
invention.45 1n fact, in certain circumstances it is preferred to patenting
because it is a more effective means of securing profits from an innovative
idea. 46 Numerous surveys demonstrate that inventors in fields in which
secrecy is feasible view secrecy as the more effective method of appropriating
their inventions. For example, using historical data from the Crystal Palace
World's Fair, Petra Moser has shown that in fields where secrecy is feasible,
41. See, e.g., Elizabeth Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fairness and the Inetitable
Disclosure Doctrine, 7 TuLANEJ. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 167, 201-03 (2005).
42. See MILGRIM, supra note 39, § 1.05.
43. 35 U.S.C. 5 112. In Ariad v. Lily, the Federal Circuit held that Section 112 requires
that a patentee both teach one skilled in the art the manner of practicing the invention
(enablement) and demonstrate that the inventor possesses the claimed invention (written
description). Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
44. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 133-34

(2006).
45. See Anthony Arundel & Isabelle Kabla, What Percentage of Inventions Are Patented?
EmpiricalEstimates of European Firms, 27 RES. POL'Y 127 (1998); Wesley Cohen et al., Protecting
TheirIntellectualAssets:Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. ManufacturingFirms Patent (orNot)
17 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000) (estimating the patent
propensity rate to be 54% for product innovations and 27% for process innovations based
on a survey of 1,478 R&D labs in the United States).
46. See Cohen et al., supra note 45, at 17; Richard C. Levin et al., Appropnating Returns
from IndustrialR&D, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACnVITY 783, 795 (1987) (reporting
results from a survey of high-level R&D executives finding that secrecy was "considered
more effective than patents in protecting processes").
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inventors typically rely on trade secret protection. 47 However, over time, as
reverse engineering becomes less costly, inventors increasingly turn to patent
protection. 48
Thus the difference in protection preference is largely attributable to the
feasibility of secrecy. Such feasibility differs among invention types and
inventive industries. Based on a 1994 survey of research labs at 1,478 U.S.
manufacturing companies, Wesley Cohen et al. found that a wide range of
industries considered secrecy to be the most effective method of
appropriating the value of an invention. Those industries included food,
textiles, paper, petroleum, all chemical industries, rubber, plastics, mineral
products, metals, machine tools, electrical equipment, motors, generators,
semiconductors, and navigation instruments. 49 Furthermore, secrecy was
"clearly the most effective" method of securing an invention for process
innovators, while patents were less effective for process than for product
innovations.so A considerable number of similar surveys confirm Cohen et
al.'s results.
For example, the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey found that certain
industries (primarily the software, internet, manufacturing, and chemical
processing industries) perceive patenting to be among the least important
means of capturing a competitive advantage.52 This stratification of value
across industry and innovation type indicates that secrecy is more valuable in
industries in which it is available (including software, manufacturing,
chemicals) and certain invention types that are less revealing (methods and
processes) while patents provide more private value for other industries
(pharmaceuticals, consumer products) and invention types (product
innovations).

47. Petra Moser, Innovation Without Patents-Evidence from World Fairs (July 16,
2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=930241.
48. Id.
49. Cohen et al., supra note 45, at 10 n.21.
50. Id. at 10.
51. See, e.g., Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneursand the PatentSystem:
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255 (2009); Levin et al.,
supra note 46, at 799 (finding that secrecy was preferred to patenting in the process
innovation industry, whereas patents were more valuable to product innovators).
52. See Graham et al., supra note 51, at 1285-87. The other strategies in the Berkeley
Patent Survey were secrecy, first-mover advantage, copyrights, trademarks, reverse
engineering, and complementary assets. Id. at 1289.

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

928

B.

[Vol. 26:917

DISCOURAGING SECRECY

With few exceptions, the existence of the United States patent system is
justified on utilitarian grounds." The patent system's goal of stimulating
innovation is manifested in the U.S. Constitution's articulation of Congress's
power to "promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."54 The reward theory is the
predominant theoretical explanation for how the patent system promotes the
progress of the useful arts.
Reward theorists justify the patent system as a means of inducing the
creation and disclosure of new and useful inventions. Without the
supranormal profits obtainable with a patent, the theory predicts that many
inventions would remain undiscovered or shrouded in secret." Reward
theory has thus been characterized by courts as a quid pro quo between
society and the inventor. In exchange for society's offer of patent protection,
the inventor must disclose her invention to the public. These dual incentives
acting upon an inventor-the incentive to invest and the incentive to
disclose-form the basis for the reward theory. The goal is that in exchange
for a twenty-year period of exclusivity, inventors will be incentivized to
create new and useful inventions and then reveal those innovations to the
public. This Section briefly discusses the quid pro quo view of the patent
system and the rhetoric employed by the courts to discourage secrecy. Then,
moving beyond the legal rhetoric, this Section describes how patent doctrine
discourages inventors from relying on trade secrecy.
1. The RhetoricalDistastefor Secrecy
Because

it requires disclosure,

patent law precludes

simultaneous

protection of an invention as both a patent and a trade secret. Beyond the
structural rejection of secrecy, patent law has traditionally been
conceptualized by courts as a means of prying secret inventions from their

53. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 6, at 329; Katherine J. Strandburg,Experimental Use and
the Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 81, 90-91 (2004). Non-utilitarian theories proffered for
the existence of the patent system include those grounded in moral rights. See, e.g., Lawrence
C. Becker, Deserving To Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 609, 619-29 (1993)
(evaluating the patent system through a desert-for-labor argument).
54. U.S. CONsT. art. I, 5 8, cl. 8.
55. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 989, 993-1000 (1997); Sichelman, supra note 12, at 358.
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inventors and disclosing those inventions to the public." The patent quid pro
quo has provided courts with a rhetorical narrative to account for the
existence of the patent system.
The traditional view envisions the possibility of a patent as the carrot that
is offered to inventors operating in secret." Viewed from this perspective,
the patent system's primary goal is to offer a reward that will incentivize
inventors to disclose their secrets to the public. The price that the public pays
for the revelation of secret inventions is the property-like exclusive rights of
patent protection. The bargain is viewed as beneficial to society because
society pays for secrets by giving up what it otherwise would not possess-a
description of the invention and the right to eventually practice that
59
invention once the patent expires.
The rhetoric surrounding the quid pro quo generally emphasizes the
social benefits of patent disclosure.o On this view, secret inventions are
unlikely to be revealed or disclosed unless a reward (in the form of a patent)
is offered to possessors of such inventions" For this rhetorical
conceptualization to make sense, one must assume that inventions benefit
society more as revealed patents than as concealed trade secrets. This view is
understandable: society obviously benefits from having valuable knowledge
disclosed. However, the assumption that patents are always preferable to
secrets fails to account for the societal costs that accompany the patent grant.
Perhaps the best example of the degree to which the rhetoric of the
patent quid pro quo has influenced the courts' view of the value of secrecy is
in the 1974 case Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.62 In Kewanee, the Supreme
Court analyzed whether state trade secret law (Ohio law in this case) was preempted by the operation of federal patent law." Kewanee Oil Co. had
developed, after significant investment, "many processes, procedures, and

56. See generally Mason v. Hepburn, 13 App. D.C. 86, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1898) (stating that
the patent law's concealment doctrine is designed to favor patentees over trade secret
holders).

57. Id.
58. See Benjamin Roin, Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or I-ack Thereof),

118 HARv. L. REv. 2007, 2010 (2005).
59. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736
(2002) ("[P]atent rights are given in exchange for disclosing the invention to the public.");
W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("Early public
disclosure is a linchpin of the patent system.").
60. See Roin, supra note 58, at 2012.
61. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1974).

62. Id.
63. Id. at 472.
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manufacturing techniques" in the growth of crystals.64 One such technique
enabled the company to grow a seventeen-inch crystal that proved useful for
the detection of ionizing radiation, which the company maintained as a trade
secret.65 Kewanee sued some of its former employees for misappropriation
of that trade secret. In reversing the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court held that the federal patent system did not preempt the
states' ability to protect trade secrets.
With respect to secret inventions, the Court viewed the patent system as
specifically designed to draw trade secrets into the public sphere. "[T]he
federal interest in disclosure is at its peak" with patentable secret inventions,
the Court concluded. In fact, the Court stated that "[t]he interest of the
public is that the bargain of 17 years of exclusive use in return for disclosure
be accepted."
Thus, the Court, without citation or much evaluation,
elevated the patent quid pro quo to a status beyond a mere bargain or
contract. In the Court's view, the Patent Act operates in large part as a
secrecy disclosing mechanism. This expansive view of the traditional patent
bargain favors disclosure of secrets without regard to the justification for
preferring patents. Indeed, the Court immediately follows its description of
the patent quid pro quo with a statement that denies, albeit in dicta, secrecy's
ability to coexist with patent law: "If a State, through a system of protection,
were to cause a substantial risk that holders of patentable inventions would
not seek patents, but rather would rely on the state protection, we would be
compelled to hold that such a system could not constitutionally continue to
exist."70 In sum, the Court understood the quid pro quo view of the patent
system as potentially in conflict with the practice of trade secrecy.
Kewanee held that trade secrecy was not preempted by the patent system
because it did not pose a reasonable risk of deterring the filing of patent
applications for reasons which have been roundly criticized by
commentators. 7 1 But the view that the patent system is designed to reduce

64. Id. at 473.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 474.
68. Id. at 489. Indeed, Katherine Strandburg has shown that it is this class of inventions
(those that are (1) eligible for patent protection, (2) more valuable to their owners as trade
secrets, and (3) promise profits greater than their development costs), and this class only,
that even concern the patent quid pro quo. Strandburg, supra note 53, at 110-11.
69. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 489.

70. Id.
71. Id. at 474, 490-91. For a strong critique of the Kewanee Court's reasoning on this
point, see Sharon K. Sandeen, Kewanee Revisited: Returning to First Prinables of Intellectual
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the number of secret inventions is a view that courts have embraced, both
before and after Kewanee. 2
The traditional view of the patent bargain emphasizes patents as
preferable to secrets. Trade secrets are seen as potential targets of the patent
system, rather than as a potentially complementary form of intellectual
property. The rhetorical heft of the patent quid pro quo tends to cloud the
tradeoffs inherent in patent protection. Furthermore, reliance on this view of
the patent quid pro quo may obscure any potential benefits that might inure
to the public by encouraging secrecy. A more complete theoretical
understanding of the costs and benefits of secrecy should be employed when
attempting to craft the proper incentives for innovation policy.
To be sure, some courts and a majority of patent scholars have framed
the quid pro quo as a choice rather than as a policy lever. Scholars recognize
that the patent system benefits society not merely because of the increased
disclosure that results from patenting, but also (and primarily) because of the
incentive to invent that the patent system creates.7 ' Any disclosure benefit
from patenting, on this view, is secondary to the benefit of increased
amounts of innovation that result from the patent bargain. This view, widely
adopted by commentators, has been the minority viewpoint for courts.
2. The DoctrinalDistastefor Secrecy

The conceptual distaste for secrecy in patent jurisprudence is also
reflected in patent doctrine. Carl Shapiro noted that "the current patent
system rewards applicants who are most aggressive in seeking patents over

Property Law To Determine the Issue of FederalPreemption, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 299,
345-47 (2008).
72. See, eg., Russo v. Ballard Med. Prods., 550 F.3d 1004, 1012 (10th Cir. 2008)
("Federal law expresses a strong interest in seeing that patentable innovations do not stay
bottled up in secret but are instead shared with the public in order to promote social
progress. This interest is most obviously embodied in patent law's bargain of providing
inventors with many years of monopoly rents in return for the public's opportunity to use
and enjoy their ideas."); Mason v. Hepburn, 13 App. D.C. 86, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1898) ("The true
ground of the [concealment] doctrine, we apprehend, lies in the policy and spirit of the
patent laws and in the nature of the equity that arises in favor of him who gives the public
the benefit of the knowledge of his invention, who expends his time, labor, and money in
discovering, perfecting, and patenting, in perfect good faith, that which he and all others
have been led to believe has never been discovered, by reason of the indifference,
supineness, or wilful act of one who may, in fact, have discovered it long before."); see also
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470 (1974) (No. 73-187), 1974 WL 185610, at *13 ("Since election by inventors to rely
on trade secret law reduces disclosure by diverting inventions away from the patent system,
technological progress is slowed, contrary to the goal of federal patent policy.").
73. Roin, supra note 58, at 2012.
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those who simply use their own inventions internally as trade secrets." 74
Patent law encourages inventors to patent secret inventions in three ways.
First, statutory bars to patentability require the prompt filing of a patent
application.7 ' Failure to file within the time period allotted by statute will
result in the loss of rights in the invention. Second, during patent priority
disputes (interferences), a first inventor can lose the rights in her invention if
she is found to have "abandoned, concealed, or suppressed" the invention.
These priority rules favor an inventor who does not employ secrecy, even if
that inventor was second in time. Third, a first inventor who chooses to
maintain her invention as a secret can be liable for infringement to a second
inventor who decides to patent.n The relative lack of "prior user rights" for
secret inventors is unique to the American patent system.
a) Statutory Bars to Patentability
An inventor loses all rights to patent an invention if she does not file a
patent application within one year of the invention being "in public use or on
sale" in the United States. Courts have set a very low standard for what
constitutes public use. The Federal Circuit has declared that public use
includes "any use of that invention by a person other than the inventor who
is under no limitation, restriction or obligation of secrecy to the inventor."o
Under this standard, public use can encompass some unrevealed uses of an
invention."' The use of an invention in secret-if connected to commercial
exploitation of the invention-may be considered public use by the courts
and the PTO.82 Public use cases largely turn on factual issues, and courts
often focus their inquiry in an evaluation of the purposes of the public use
bar.83 Among these purposes is the encouragement of prompt patent filing.84
74. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 95; see also Margo A. Bagley, The Needfor Speed (and Grace):
Issues in a First-Inventor-To-File World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1035, 1049 (2008) (discussing
the U.S. first-to-invent system's "default preference" for patents over trade secrets).
75. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).

76. § 102(g).
77. See infra Section II.B.2.c.
78. For information on exceptions to this general rule, see infra note 96.
79. 5 102(b).
80. In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
81. MPEP, supra note 17, 5 2133.03(a).II.A.1; see also Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333,
336 (1882) (stating that public use may occur "even though the use and knowledge of the
use may be confined to one person").
82. MPEP, supra note 17, 5 2133.03(a).II.A.1; see also TP Labs, Inc. v. Profl Positioners,
Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 972 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that secret but commercial use of an
invention could constitute "public use" under the statute).
83. See, e.g., Egbert, 104 U.S. at 338 (holding that a corset patent was invalid because of
the public-use bar); Motionless Keyboard Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed.
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Courts have also lowered the threshold requirements for what constitutes
"on sale." In Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., the Supreme Court affirmed a
decision that the on-sale bar had been triggered by an offer to sell, even
though the invention was not reduced to practice at the time of the offer.
Thus, a sale of an as-yet-unreduced-to-practice invention can begin the oneyear time period in which an inventor has to patent an invention. For
inventive methods, the sale of a product tied to the inventive method may
trigger the on-sale bar even if the method remains concealed." The on-sale
and public use bars encourage inventors to file for patents at an early stage of
an invention's development. Pfaff's holding discourages inventors from
maintaining inventions as trade secrets while conducting initial commercial
activities because the time period for filing a patent begins once an offer for
sale has been made.
b) Patent Priority Rules
When two inventors apply for a patent on the same invention, a complex
set of priority rules governs who will receive the patent. Priority is
determined at the filing stage in a proceeding called an interference. A similar
set of rules governs whether a prior invention is considered prior art in
determining validity at trial. Under American law, the first inventor to file is
presumed to be the first to invent.8 8 But that presumption is rebuttable upon
a showing that another inventor actually reduced the invention to practice
prior to the earliest filing date," with several caveats, one of which is
described immediately below."
Although the American system generally rewards the first inventor, a
second inventor can receive patent protection over a first inventor if she can
demonstrate that the first inventor "abandoned, suppressed, or concealed"
the invention at any time after the second inventor successfully created the

Cir. 2007) (reversing a finding of invalidity due to the trial court's misapplication of the
concept of public use).
84. See, e.g., Nancy S. Paik, Implied Professional Obligation of Confidentiality Sufident To
Overcome Public Use Defense to a Claim of Patent Infringement? Bernhardt v. Collezione-The
FederalCircuitCourt ofAppeals' SurprisingRecent Announcement on the Public Use Bar,4 CHI.-KENT
J. INTELL. PROP. 332, 333-34 (2005).
85. 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
86. Id.
87. See In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 675-76 (Fed. Cit. 1985) (stating that sale of the
product of a secret method triggers the on-sale bar).
88. See, e.g., Charles L. Gholz, First To File or First To Invent?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 891 (2000).
89. 1 DONALD S. CHIsUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 10.03f1][C][1] (2006).
90. See infra Section II.B.2.c.

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

934

[Vol. 26:917

invention.9 ' All three statutory terms reflect a single concept of an inventor
who fails to patent an invention or commercialize it, or both.92 For the PTO
to consider an invention concealed, it need only be shown that an inventor
did not take active steps to make an invention publicly known. Courts have
interpreted concealment to mean that within a reasonable amount of time,
no steps have been taken by the inventor to make the invention publicly
known.93 Public knowledge may occur through a patent application, a public
announcement, or public use.94 Not only can an inventor who both invented
and filed for a patent first lose all rights to her invention, she also may not be
able to use her prior invention to invalidate the second inventor's patent.s
c) Prior User Rights
The third aspect of the patent system that discourages secrecy is U.S.
patent law's general lack of prior user rights. Unlike trade secret holders in a
majority of countries, 6 U.S. inventors do not generally possess prior user
rights in their inventions." That is, a first inventor that practices her
invention in secret cannot use her prior use and invention as a defense

91. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006).
92. See 1 CHISUM, supranote 89, § 10.08 [1].
93. Correge v. Murphy, 705 F.2d 1326, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

94. Id.
95. In re Suska, 589 F.2d 527, 529 (C.C.P.A. 1979) ("The result of applying the
suppression and concealment doctrine is that the inventor who did not conceal (but was the
'De facto' last inventor) is treated legally as the first to invent, while the 'De facto' first
inventor who suppressed or concealed is treated as a later inventor."). This surprising result
affects both who is entitled to the patent and whether a first invention constitutes prior art
and invalidates another's later-issued patent. Id. But see Dunlop v. Ram, 524 F.2d 33 (7th Cir.
1975) (holding that "secret" use of a machine or process is "public" if the details of the
machine or process are ascertainable by inspection or analysis of the product that is sold or
publicly displayed). Robert Merges explains the difference in the case law by focusing on the
inventor's actions rather than the nature of the invention. When inventors intentionally
conceal (as opposed to merely possess non-revealing technology) courts tend to consider the
invention suppressed. ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAw & POLICY 461 (4th ed. 2007).
96. The Patent Prior User Rights Act and the Patent Reexamination Reform Act: Hearing on S.
2272 and S. 2341 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciay, 103d Cong. 24 (1994) (statement of Roger S. Smith, President, Intellectual Property
Owners, and Assistant General Counsel for Intellectual Property Affairs, IBM) (noting that
prior user rights are "common" in foreign countries and that a WIPO study found that the
"vast majority" have such rights).
97. A prominent exception to the lack of prior user rights in the United States was
adopted by Congress in 1999. 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006). The 1999 "safe-harbor" was granted
to protect companies with business method trade secrets that feared a rush of patenting after
the Federal Circuit's decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. SignatureFinancialGroup, Inc.,
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Robert C. Haldiman, Prior User Rigbts for Business Method
Patents, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 245, 246 (2001).
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against a subsequent patentee.98 For example, consider the case of Inventor 1
inventing an improved method of manufacturing widgets. If she chooses to
maintain her invention as a secret, she loses her right to patent that invention
one year after she sells the invention or puts it into public use.99 Those
priority rules limit Inventor I's ability to claim exclusive rights in her
invention after certain activities occur.
The lack of prior user rights, however, does more than merely limit
Inventor l's ability to patent her invention; it potentially limits her ability to
practice her own invention. If Inventor 2 discovers and patents the method
of manufacturing widgets, she can sue Inventor 1 for infringement.'
Inventor 1's earlier invention and use is not a valid defense to patent
infringement. Therefore the possibility of infringement liability hangs over
the head of a first inventor if she chooses to practice her invention in
secret.10 ' The threat of infringement liability to a subsequent inventor can be
a powerful deterrent against keeping an invention secret. o2
III.

EXAMINING SECRECY

Patent law's doctrinal discouragement of secrecy attempts to influence
inventors at the margins to patent rather than maintain trade secrets. Courts
routinely reference the patent quid pro quo without examination of the
theoretical relationship between patents and trade secrets.' 03 Reliance upon
the accepted wisdom of patents as preferable to secrets obscures the benefits
that secrecy might provide. This Part fills the theoretical lacuna of the
patent/trade secret trade-off from a societal perspective. In doing so, it
examines the potential benefits and drawbacks of secrecy when compared to
patenting.
98. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 32-34 (2008).

99. See supra Section II.B.2.a.
100. This assumes, of course, that Inventor 2 did not misappropriate the invention. If
so, Inventor 1 may have a claim for misappropriation.
101. See, e.g., Gillman v. Stern, 114 F.2d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1940).
102. See Vincenzo Denicol6 & Luigi A. Franzoni, Patents, Secrets, and the First Inventor
Defense, 13 J. ECON. MGMT. & STRATEGY 517, 518-19 (2004).
103. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989)
("Thus, from the outset, federal patent law has been about the difficult business 'of drawing
a line between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive
patent, and those which are not.' ") (quoting 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 335
(definitive ed. 1907)); United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-87
(1933) ("Thus a monopoly takes something from the people. An inventor deprives the
public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery, but gives something of value to the
community by adding to the sum of human knowledge.").
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This Part proceeds in three Sections. Section III.A examines the
theoretical economic justification for patenting (and intellectual property
more generally) and the relationship that justification has with secrecy. It
concludes that the economic concern motivating the patent system-the
public goods market failure-is inapplicable when secrecy is an available
appropriation means. Thus, as a theoretical matter, the economic justification
for conferring patent protection on secrecy-appropriable inventions is
lacking. Section III.B considers the traditional support offered by courts and
theorists for discouraging secrecy, namely the benefits of disclosure and
coordination. In doing so, this Section examines the ability of trade secrecy
to perform the same beneficial functions often attributed to the patent
system. Lastly, Section III.C describes the overlooked potential benefits of
secrecy.
A.

SECRET INVENTIONS AND PUBLIC GOODS

Unlike real property, intellectual property law (and patent law more
specifically) is concerned with intangible assets. Unlike land, which can be
depleted by overuse, information can be reused infinitely with no depletion
to the resource. Thus, economists often refer to information as a pure
"public good."104 Public goods are those goods which are nonexcludable
(cannot easily be excluded from others' use) and nonrivalrous (consumption
by one person does not deplete the resource). Information is analogized to a
public good because it can be easily copied (nonexcludable) and used by an
infinite number of individuals (nonrival).'0 o
Lighthouses are the classic example of a public good.' The light from
the lighthouse is essentially nonrivalrous: the use of the light by one ship
does not diminish the value of the light to another ship. The light is also
nonexcludable: a lighthouse owner cannot easily exclude users from using the
lighthouse's services-those that refuse to pay for a lighthouse's guidance
(free riders) enjoy the same benefits as those that pay. Thus, the
nonexcludability of the light drives the price down to a point where a

104. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Wefare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS
609, 614-16 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962).
105. Id.; Mark A. Lemley, ExAnte Versus Ex PostJustficationsfor IntellectualProperly, 71 U.
CHI. L. REv. 129 (2004) ("Ideas are public goods: they can be copied freely and used by
anyone who is aware of them without depriving others of their use."); Lemley, Free Riding,
supra note 13, at 1050-51.
106. Christopher Yoo, Copyrigbt and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relationshij,
155 U. PA. L. REv. 635, 644 & n.25 (2007).
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lighthouse owner cannot profitably provide the good, even though there is
demand.
The economic literature predicts that public goods such as lighthouses
and innovative information will be under-produced in an unregulated market
because of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of capturing the positive
externalities of such goods.o7 For example, because she cannot capture the
social benefit that her light creates, a lighthouse owner will operate her
lighthouse at less than the socially optimal level. Analogizing lighthouses to
information predicts the same result: inventive information will be
suboptimally produced because competitors will be able to copy the
information at low cost and drive the market for innovative products
towards marginal cost. Rational inventors will not invest heavily in producing
new knowledge when they know that they will be unable to recoup their
investment costs.
The economic justification for the patent system depends upon the
public goods rationale" 8 : because inventions are nonexcludable, new
inventions will be suboptimally produced absent patent protection.
Economists see the patent system as a means of transforming nonexcludable
public goods (inventive ideas) into private goods (patented inventions).'09
Thus, the innovation market failure is overcome with the promise of
supranormal profits via the excludability offered by a patent."0
However, the public goods analogy fails to justify granting patents when
secrecy is available. There are two reasons for this imperfect fit. First,
inventions that are appropriable as trade secrets do not suffer from the
excludability problems associated with pure public goods; such inventions are
excludable via secrecy itself."' Inventions that can be appropriated as trade
secrets do not, by definition, require non-market incentives-such as the

107. See A.C. PIGoU, THE ECONOMiCS OF WELFARE 331 (4th ed. 1938) (describing how
externalities can result in suboptimal production of goods); see also Francis M. Bator, The
Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351, 370 (1958) (describing market failures based
upon nonappropriability).
108. See, e.g., Holbrook, supra note 44, at 132; Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 13, at 1053
("[T]he basic economic justification for intellectual property law comes from ... the risk that
creators will not make enough money in a market economy to cover their costs.").
109. See Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, reprinted in
SELECTED ECONOMIc ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 36 (Inst. of Econ. Affairs ed., 1974).
110. Lemley, supra note 55, at 993-1000 (stating the traditional economic argument for
the patent system's ability to overcome the public goods market failure).
111. See Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 13, at 1057 ("Economic theory offers no
justification for rewarding creators anything beyond what is necessary to recover their
average total costs.").
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patent system-to attract investment ex ante.' 12 An inventor can amortize
her investment via secrecy rather than the patent system. This is true
precisely because secret inventions enjoy the natural market inefficiency of
secrecy. That is, because the information contained in a secret invention is
not widely known, holders of such knowledge can often obtain greater
profits than would be possible if the information were public.
Mark Lemley argues that the presence of market imperfections, such as
secrecy, does not change the public good nature of information." 3 I take no
quarrel with that position. However, to the extent that patent theory is
concerned with overcoming free riding, the question is not whether
information is a public good, but rather whether the problems that public
goods create (nonexcludability in this case) can be overcome. When secrecy
is selected by an inventor to protect an innovation, we can presume the
absence of a public goods market failure. In fact, by rewarding innovators the
market is operating as desired. The choice to maintain an invention as a trade
secret indicates an inventor's belief that her up-front research costs can be
recouped outside of the patent system. In such a case, secrecy circumvents
the public goods problem without resorting to patenting.
Certainly, there are cases in which inventions will be under-produced in
the absence of the patent system's legally-sanctioned excludability. In some
instances, the patent system may be the only means of profitably excluding
free riders. But the patent system is not always necessary to foster
innovation. Indeed, in many industries, secrecy provides greater incentives to
invent, as evidenced by innovator's preference for secrecy."
The second reason that the public goods analogy is inapplicable for cases
in which secrecy is feasible is that patents are often a poor means of creating
excludability in those cases. Even if we accept the public goods rationale, the
patent system must demonstrate that it can overcome the problems
associated with public goods, primarily nonexcludability.
However, unlike with real property, detection of infringement of
intellectual property boundaries requires knowledge that is often
unobtainable to a trade secret holder. Just as secrecy is a market inefficiency
112. F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 444-45 (2d ed. 1980) (noting that natural market imperfections reduce the
need for intellectual property protection).
113. Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 13, at 1052 n.87.
114. In a 1994 survey, secrecy was considered the most effective method of
appropriability in a wide, diverse range of industries, including food, textiles, paper,
petroleum, all chemical industries, rubber, plastics, mineral products, metals, machine tools,
electrical equipment, motors, generators, semiconductors, and navigation instruments.
Cohen et al., supra note 45, at 10 n.21.
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that inventors can leverage to their benefit, it can be a detriment in detecting
infringement. Whenever secrecy enables an inventor to hide her inventions
from the public, secrecy is also likely to prevent the inventor from detecting
infringing use of her invention.' If maintaining an invention in secret is
realistic, competitors may feel that the risk of being caught infringing a
patented invention is negligible. Patents provide little solace for the owner of
such an invention. Patent law requires full disclosure but does not guarantee
full compliance by competitors. If detection of infringement is difficult or
impossible, the patentee has little ability to enforce her rights. Thus, patents
are likely to be a poor means of excludability when inventions are truly
maintainable as trade secrets.
As shown, inventions that can be carried out profitably in secret do not
justify legal interventions into the marketplace to overcome the public goods
problem."' Because secret inventions are excludable, they do not suffer from
the problems associated with public goods. Because of the natural
excludability provided by secrecy, utilitarian patent theorists should refuse
patents in cases in which secrecy is a viable option for inventors."'
The lack of justification for granting patents when secrecy is available
might not be problematic if patents were costless. If patents were costless,
society might be agnostic to the use of and justification for patents.
However, patents are not costless. They result in deadweight losses to
consumers because patent holders can charge supranormal rates for patented
inventions to the extent that the patent offers the ability to exclude
competitors."' Ideally, these losses are justified by the value of the
innovation that is incentivized by the patent reward. However, in cases where
the patent system is not required to encourage research into an invention,
such as when secrecy is a viable option, the patent system does not

115. A. Samuel Oddi, Un-unified Economic Theories of Patents-TheNot-Quite-Hoy Grail,71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 285 n.126 (1996) (citing Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the
Patent Districts: Obserations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REv. 359, 376-77 (1992))
(noting that trade secret protection is preferable to patent protection for processes because it
is difficult to detect infringement of a process).
116. See SCHERER, supra note 112, at 444-46 (noting that natural market imperfections
such as imitation lags, first-mover advantage, and nonpatent barriers reduce the economic
need for patent protection).
117. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 379 (2003) (stating that intellectual property rights should
be granted only when "making intellectual property rights excludable creates value").
118. Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Propery Lwn, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
LAW AND ECONOMIcS 1473 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
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encourage innovation, it merely rewards it." 9 To the extent that the patent
system is unnecessary to promote innovation, analysis of the benefits and
drawbacks of permitting patenting must be examined in order to determine
the most socially beneficial means of encouraging innovation.
B.

TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DISCOURAGING THE USE OF
SECRECY

1. Disclosure
Courts have consistently cited the second incentive of patent law's
reward theory-the disclosure incentive-as the principal benefit that the
public receives from the patent system.120 Legal theorists have similarly
emphasized the harm resulting from reduced disclosure when inventions are
maintained as secrets.121 Indeed, disclosure and its accompanying benefits are
fundamental to traditional notions of the patent quid pro quo. Katherine
Strandburg has noted that when secret inventions are lured into the patent
system the only benefit to the public is the resulting disclosure.' 22
Furthermore, fears regarding the increased use of trade secrecy have centered
around the harm to the public of decreased disclosure.123 In sum, it is
presumed that patents are better at promoting innovation than secrets due to
patent law's disclosure doctrine.
However, there are three reasons to suspect that the effectiveness of
patent disclosure in encouraging innovation is somewhat limited. First,
patents generally do a poor job of promoting innovation through teaching.
Patents do not perform much of a teaching function because of some
paradoxical elements of patent law that discourage would-be innovators from

119. Strandburg, supra note 53, at 111 (finding that the reward theory cannot justify
granting patents for inventions that can profitably be maintained in secret).
120. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481, 489 (1974); Pfaff v.
Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (stating that the patent system should be thought of
as "a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of
new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited
period of time"). For a more thorough discussion of the courts' treatment of the disclosure
requirement, see Roin, supranote 58, at 2011-13.
121. See F. ScorT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAw 68 (4th ed. 2008)
(describing the basis of patent law's incentive to disclose and stating that "secrecy would
deprive the public of the new knowledge").
122. Strandburg, supra note 53, at 111.
123. See Brief of Respondents, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)
(No. 73-187), 1973 WL 172412; Brief of Amicus Curiae National Patent Council, Inc. for
Itself and Representing National Small Business Association, Inc., Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (No. 73-187), 1973 WL 173805; Doerfer, supra note 6, at

1441.
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consulting patents for technical knowledge. Second, disclosure requirements
are often insufficient to promote disclosure that would enable follow-on
innovation. Patentees in some industries are able to obtain patent protection
while retaining essential know-how. Thus, some inventors are able to patent
an invention while still maintaining enough of the invention in secret to
prevent valuable knowledge from being transferred to the public. Third,
concerns about the loss of public disclosure that would result from increased
use of trade secrecy may be overblown. Trade secret law permits a limited
form of disclosure that may replicate many of the beneficial effects of patent
disclosure.
a) The Ineffective Teaching Function of Patent Disclosure
The courts' view of the patent quid pro quo often focuses on the
innovation benefits that result from disclosing secret inventions. 2 4 The
portrayal of disclosure as an innovation-promoting mechanism is not without
theoretical support. If disclosure disseminates information that encourages
follow-on innovation, then the social cost of the patent grant may be less
than the social benefit of the follow-on innovation.'25 Wile patents exclude
others from producing products that are covered by the patent's claims,
perhaps the disclosure of the invention to the public will teach others the
novel method or product and encourage improvements or tangential
innovations that would not have occurred without the lesson contained
within the patent. As an added benefit, after patent expiration the disclosed
invention enters the public domain, free for all to use. In contrast, entrance
into the public domain does not occur automatically with trade secrecy.
But, there are reasons to doubt the extent of the patent system's ability to
teach follow-on innovators. Much of the doubt in the literature concerning
patent law's teaching ability stems from aspects of the patent system that
discourage innovators from consulting patents. Timothy Holbrook pointed
to four aspects of the patent system that undermine the disclosure function
of patents: the limited experimental use exception, the risk of willful
infringement faced by those that do examine prior patents, the eighteenmonth delay for publication of patent applications, and the moribund reverse
doctrine of equivalents. 126 Holbrook concluded that "[nJot only are the
disclosure obligations inconsistent with the theoretical justifications of patent

124. For more on potential reasons for courts' and scholars' differing explanations for
the patent system, see Roin, supra note 58, at 2012 (speculating on the reasons for courts'
preference for the disclosure rationale).
125. Holbrook, supra note 44, at 134 n.56.
126. Id. at 139-45.
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law, but the current structure of the patent system undermines the ability of
patents to actually perform this function."'27
The Federal Circuit effectively eliminated any experimental use exception
for practicing an invention by follow-on innovators.'28 Follow-on innovators
can read a patent, but they cannot make or use the patent in order to study
the invention's properties or the manner in which it functions.12 9 Without
such a right, the ability of a patent to teach anything is severely limited.
Furthermore, innovators who examine patents risk triggering a duty to
investigate infringement and liability for willful infringement with
accompanying treble damages. 30 Lastly, patent applications are not published
for at least eighteen months, which reduces their value as teaching aids to
follow-on innovators.' 3 ' Many industries have such rapid innovation rates
that eighteen-month-old innovations are relegated to the history books.
Other commentators concur in Holbrook's findings that the patent system's
disclosure ability is overstated.'3 2
Jeanne Fromer has argued that disclosure promotes the progress of
science and the useful arts not only in economic terms-that is, by
conferring information to society that can be used for future innovationsbut also by democratizing the process of innovation."' Fromer argued that
disclosure levels the scientific playing field by permitting all interested parties
to operate with the same basic information. According to Fromer, numerous

127. Id. at 146.
128. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Holbrook, supra
note 44, at 140.
129. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362-63.
130. See In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1366-71 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc); Mark A.
Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Wilfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1085, 1090 (2003).
131. Patent applicants filing only in the United States can opt out of the eighteen-month
publication requirement. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B) (2006). A 2002 study suggests that eleven
percent of U.S. applications are not published at eighteen months. NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 64 (2004).
132. See Doerfer, supra note 6, at 1444 (observing, wryly, that "the method in which the
[patent] statute is administered seems to be quite compatible with the nondisclosure aims of
trade secret law"); Roin, supra note 58, at 2027-28; Strandburg, supra note 53, at 113-18.
Doerfer also notes that patent law's claim to promote disclosure is undermined by the secret
nature of patent applications. Doerfer, supra note 6, at 1445. Since Doerfer's article, most
patent applications are now published after eighteen months. While this change clearly
reflects a desire for more disclosure, a system that truly valued disclosure over all other
considerations would publish applications at filing.
133. Jeanne C. Fromer, PatentDisclosure, 94 IOWA L. REv. 539, 551 (2009).
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minds are more capable of effecting technological progress than centralized
control.13 4
While justifying the theoretical basis for disclosure as a democratizing
discovery, Fromer agrees with Holbrook that patents do not, in general,
fulfill their teaching role.135 She points to evidence that most inventors spend
little to no time reading others' patents.136 This lack of relevance for
technologists may stem from fear of willful infringement, 137 the inability to
comprehend the legal jargon of a patent document,13 8 or the lack of
meaningful information that patents convey.139 Patentees themselves tend not
to consult others' patents,140 and they learn of the patents that are eventually
cited in their own applications only after invention.14' Furthermore, inventors
rank patents last among sources of inspiration for their inventions. 4 2
Part of the explanation for innovators' apparent disinterest in patent
documents is that patents are a poor medium for communicating technical
information.14 Although patent specifications are meant to be written for
those skilled in the art, most scientists and engineers find patents to be
repetitive and often incomprehensible.144 Rules of claim construction
134. Id.
135. Id. at 560-62 ("[Tjhe evidence tends to show that potential inventors are not
turning to patent disclosures to inspire their research.").
136. Id. at 560.
137. Lemley, supranote 37, at 1510 n.63.
138. Robert Bart, Speech at the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice
Antitrust Division Roundtable on Competition, Economic, and Business Perspectives on
Substantive Patent Law Issues: Non-Obviousness and Other Patentability Criteria 79-80
(Oct. 30, 2002), available athttp://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/021030trans.pdf.
139. Doerfer, supra note 6, at 1444 (noting the Patent Office's "reluctance to require
detailed specifications").
140. See Adam B. Jaffe, The Meaning of Patent Citations, in ADAM B. JAFFE & MANUEL
TRAJTENBERG, PATENTS, CITATIONS, AND INNOVATIONS: A WINDOW ON THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 389-90 & fig.5 (2002) (finding that less than 20% of patentees
"learn about" the patents eventually cited in their applications before working on their
inventions).
141. Id.
142. Behind "awareness of a commercial or technological opportunity, word of mouth,
personal interactions, viewing a presentation or demonstration, joint work with others, and
technical literature." Fromer, supra note 133, at 562; accord James Bessen, Patents and the
D:Jusion of Technical Information, 86 ECON. LETTERS 121, 122 (2005); Asish Arora, Marco
Ceccagnoli & Wesley M. Cohen, R&D and the Patent Premium 17 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 9431, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9431
(finding no measurable impact on information flows resulting from patent disclosure).
143. See Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621,
633-41 (2010) (describing how the widespread use of "patentese" reduces the teaching
function of patents); see also Roin, supra note 58, at 2025.
144. Fromer, supranote 133, at 560-62; Roin, supranote 58, at 2025.
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encourage patent attorneys to draft their specifications broadly so as not to
have the narrowness of their disclosure read into their claims 145
Patentees can avoid fully disclosing their inventions via a number of
methods. First, inventors can delay publication of their patent application
until their patent issues. Patent applications are usually published eighteen
months after they are filed, but if a patentee agrees to file for patent
protection only in the United States, publication is delayed until issuance.146
Patent applications typically take much longer than eighteen months to issue
as patents; thus innovators in industries with product cycles that are shorter
than the period of patent pendency can delay disclosure until after their
innovation is obsolete.147
Second, patentees in certain industries can disclose enough information
to obtain a patent but less than enough to reveal how that innovation is
practiced. This is especially common in the software, computer hardware,
and business innovation industries.14 ' This practice permits innovators to
patent the central innovation of their invention yet retain certain trade secret
know-how or show-how that is required to effectively practice the
invention. 149 Although the Federal Circuit requires patent applications to
"provide a disclosure sufficient to enable one skilled in the art to carry out
the invention,"' oftentimes a follow-on innovator must enter into a license
agreement with a patentee to obtain the knowledge withheld from the patent
application. Without that information, it is often difficult and costly to
practice (and thus improve upon) an invention.'"' Thus, any claim that
disclosure, by itself, provides a benefit to the public greater than the cost of a
patent grant is weakened.' 52 If follow-on innovators must obtain information
directly from patentees in order to practice a patented invention, then that
145. Roin, supra note 58, at 2026 (citing claim drafting advice encouraging practitioners
to describe as many variations as possible).
146. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B) (2006).
147. See Roin, supra note 58, at 2024 (finding that innovators in industries with short
product cycles are more likely to withhold disclosure until issuance).
148. Id. at 2024 n.102 (citing FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 3, at 33 (2003),
available at http://wvw.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf).
149. See Jorda, supranote 21, at 31; Gregory J. Maier, Software Protection-IntegratingPatent,
Copynght and Trade Secret Law, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 151, 163-65 (1987)
(noting that software developers can obtain patent rights while not disclosing source code).
150. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cit. 1991).
151. See Roin, supra note 58, at 2025 (noting that "[m]any patented inventions cannot be
recreated" from the information contained in the patent, without that information licensing
or reverse engineering is required to practice an invention).
152. Id. at 2025 (stating that the practice of not disclosing key know-how in a patent
"calls into question the extent to which patent disclosures can produce R&D spillovers").
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patent disclosure has provided, at most, a means of locating the information
necessary to perform further research.
All of this is not to suggest that patent disclosure is without value. Even
if the teaching function of patents is limited, there are occasions in which the
disclosure of an invention can lead to innovation that is not measurable by
the impact of the patent document alone. For instance, the existence of
patent protection may permit the scientific publication of ground-breaking
research that otherwise would have remained concealed. 5 3 That is, even if
patents do not adequately disclose information, they may enable scientists to
disclose research via other means that better serve follow-on innovators.
But while such instances of valuable disclosure undoubtedly exist, they
do not, standing alone, justify the discouragement of secrecy. There are other
types of secret information, outside of patentable subject matter, that would
promote innovation if disclosed, such as business survey information,
customer data, laboratory data, etc. 54 Society refuses to pay for this
information precisely because there is no reason to do so-it will be
produced privately to the extent it is valuable. The public does not demand a
complete democratization of competition. Indeed, competition relies on
companies retaining certain tangible or intangible advantages over their
competitors. Typically policy makers rely upon market mechanisms and
scientific norms to determine what information is valuable enough for
private individuals to invest in its creation.
b) Trade Secret Disclosure
Trade secrecy does not enjoy a system of mandated public disclosure, as
patent law does. Indeed, public disclosure of a secret destroys the legal
protection of trade secret law. However, commentators have noted that trade
secret law encourages disclosure, although of a more targeted nature than
patent disclosure.'s The Court in Kewanee relied on trade secrecy's limited

153. See id. at 2027 ("Even given the current structural limitations, however, the patent
system still serves a limited disclosure function by allowing inventors to discuss and publicize
their research freely.").
154. See, e.g., Henry J. Silberberg & Eric G. Lardiere, Eroding Protection of Customer lists
and Customer Information Under the Unform Trade Secrets Act, 42 BuS. LAw. 487, 487 (1987)
(noting that unpatentable customer information is among many businesses' "most precious"
trade secrets).
155. Lemley, supra note 6, at 314 ("[F]or certain types of inventions we may actually get
more useful 'disclosure' at less cost from trade secret than from patent law."); Sandeen, supra
note 71, at 344 (noting that while the qualitative and quantitative scope of disclosure is
different with trade secrets and patents, "it is true that trade secret law helps to facilitate the
sharing of secret information between those with a need to know").
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promotion of disclosure in finding no preemption of trade secret laws.'16 By
protecting against misappropriation, trade secrecy reduces the cost of
protecting secrets and permits innovators to market their ideas, as long as
Thus, trade secrecy
owners engage in a minimum level of protection.
exhibits some elements of disclosure that patent law encourages."' Of
course, patent holders can engage in the same targeted disclosure as trade
secret holders, and with less risk of loss of protection. But it is likely that
many of the benefits to future innovation that come from patent disclosure
can also exist in the more limited world of trade secret disclosure.
Indeed, given the scope of trade secret protection, inventors who
maintain inventions as trade secrets likely have more incentive to efficiently
disclose their inventions to the proper individuals. As described more fully in
Section III.C, infra, trade secrecy encourages competition because the
exclusivity of trade secrecy can end at any time. Thus, unlike patents, which
have a certain duration, trade secret owners likely feel time pressure to
maximize the value of an innovation. Thus trade secrets may lead to earlieralbeit more limited--disclosure than patents.
The idea that targeted, limited, inventor-initiated disclosure is more
beneficial than patent disclosure for promoting innovation is open to debate.
However, given the limited value of broad-based patent disclosure, it is likely
that the innovative benefits resulting from trade secret's targeted disclosure at
least approach the innovative value of patent disclosure.
2. Coordination of Commercialiationand Research
The prospect theory, a second major strain of patent theory, concerns
itself with efficiently allocating scarce research dollars. Edward Kitch
suggested that the patent system places the patent holder "in a position to
coordinate the search for technological and market enhancement of the
patent[]," thus "increas[ing] the efficiency with which investment in
innovation can be managed.""' Kitch viewed the patent holder as having the
power to coordinate future investment in the prospect because "no one is
likely to make significant investments in searching for ways to increase the
156. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1974) (describing a
disclosure function in trade secret law).
157. Additionally, trade secret law permits the disclosure of secrets "in
connection ... with information that is relevant to public health or safety, or to the
commission of a crime or tort, or other matters of substantial concern." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 illus. 1(c) (1993).
158. See Sandeen, supra note 71, at 344.
159. Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Funtion of the PatentSystem, 20 J.L. & EcON. 265, 276

(1977).
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commercial value of a patent unless he has made previous arrangements with
the owner of the patent" to share in the profits of that effort. 160
A patent system focused on coordinating downstream research activity,
like that envisioned by prospect theorists, would likely benefit from the
disclosure of secret inventions: increased openness would lead to increased
coordination. However, the prospect theory presupposes that patents lead to
coordination of research and that markets for innovation coordination
operate efficiently. Both of these assumptions are contentious. First, as
demonstrated in Section III.B.1.a, supra, patent documents do not do a good
job of facilitating research or commercialization coordination. Scientists
rarely consult patent documents."' The sheer number of patents issued every
year (over 200,000 in 2010) makes it impossible for an innovator to stay
current with all of the issued patents in a particular field.'6 2 Owners of trade
secrets are just as likely as patent holders to seek out those that can best
commercialize and market an innovation, perhaps more so. 63 Patent
protection and disclosure may have the perverse effect of placating the drive
of patentees from seeking out commercialization partners; they can simply

rely on the patent for protection against competition or independent
invention.
Numerous scholars have cast doubt on the assumption that pioneering
inventors will efficiently market their patented technology. Rebecca
Eisenberg noted that the likelihood of efficient licensing is lowest when
"subsequent researchers want to use prior inventions to make further
progress in the same field in competition with the patent holder."' 64 Robert
Merges explained that bargaining breakdowns occur between holders of
blocking patents as a result of mistaken assumptions and irrational choices."'
As a corollary to the prospect theory's emphasis on coordination of
research and development of an invention, the theory also emphasizes the

160. Id.
161. Fromer, supra note 133, at 560-62. Fromer also notes that the Intellectual Property
Owners Association Survey likely overestimates the number of technologists who consult
patents prior to invention by lumping together the research stage of invention with latter
stages of invention. Id. at 561 n.104.
162. See PTO, U.S. PatentStatistics, supra note 9.
163. See generally Sichelman, supra note 12 (arguing that the dominant theories of patent
law do not incentivize commercialization of patented inventions).
164. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1072-73 (1989).
165. Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Propery Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of
Blocking Patents,62 TENN. L. REv. 75, 89 (1994).
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elimination, or at least reduction, of duplicative research." ' Kitch noted that
"a patent system enables firms to signal each other, thus reducing the amount
of duplicative investment in innovation.""' In Kitch's view, patents put "the
patent owner in a position to coordinate the search for technological and
market enhancements of the patent's value so that duplicative investments
are not made and so that information is exchanged among the searchers."
Secrecy, to Kitch, does not permit other researchers to determine the
efficient level of search.'6 1 Indeed, Kitch viewed the fact that "technological
information can be used without signaling that fact to another",70 as a
problem that the patent system intends to solve. Other firms are unlikely to
know of the success of the original inventors and thus cannot redirect their
research accordingly. As Kitch acknowledged, under a trade secrecy regime
"the competitive firm might never learn of a new product until it is
marketed." 7 1
However, duplicative research can provide social benefits. First, multiple
firms inventing in the same area can result in distinct and improved
innovations. 172 Firms that are initially engaged in pursuing the same goal
often end up inventing different means of achieving that goal. Society
benefits from having varied innovative products. Furthermore, multiple
inventive efforts can result in new uses for the same product. In the area of
biochemistry, for instance, multiple firms investigating a similar chemical
compound can develop different uses for the compound. This also leads to
competition and lower prices for consumers.
Duplication of research and commercialization efforts is often
indistinguishable from competition. 7 Competition entails duplication of

166. Many reward theorists take a skeptical view to limiting independent invention
because competition is also reduced. See Lemley, supra note 6, at 336 n.103. Duplication of
research and commercialization efforts is often indistinguishable from competition. See
Vermont, supra note 30, at 495. Competition entails duplication of costs by competing firms
(an inefficient cost), but it also results in increased production and lowered costs for
consumers (a social benefit). Id. Rivalry among firms to develop and create new inventions is
seen by many reward theorists as deserving of encouragement from the law. See Robert P.
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
839, 908 (1988). While rivalry creates inefficient duplication of effort and resources among
competitors, it also tends to generate rapid technological progress. Id.
167. Kitch, supra note 159, at 278.
168. Id. at 276.
169. Id. at 278.
170. Id. at 276.
171. Id. at 278.
172. See Lemley, supra note 6, at 336 n.103.
173. See Vermont, supra note 30, at 495.
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costs by competing firms (an inefficient cost), but also results in increased
production and lowered costs for consumers (a social benefit).174 Rivalry
among firms to create and develop new inventions is seen by many reward
theorists as deserving of encouragement from the law.' While rivalry creates
duplication of effort and resources among competitors, it also tends to
generate rapid technological progress."'
A final potential benefit of invention races is that duplicative research
may actually encourage disclosure. John Duffy has a different take on
secrecy's effect on duplicative research than Kitch. Duffy asserts that secrecy
is much more difficult to maintain in the initial stages of research than Kitch
suggests. 77 He claims that in the initial stages of research, firms may be
incentivized to communicate their results with competitors rather than
maintain them in secret."'7 Thus, to the extent that research secrecy is
difficult to maintain, duplicative research and secrecy can, in some instances,
lead to increased disclosure among competitors.
C.

THE OVERLOOKED BENEFITS OF SECRECY

1. Increased Competition
The innovative benefits of trade secrecy have often been overlooked by
courts and commentators.' Perhaps the primary benefit of secrecy is that of
increased competition for innovative ideas. Robert Merges and Richard
Nelson stated that "multiple and competitive sources of invention are
socially preferable to a structure where there is only one or a few sources.
Public policy, including patent law, ought to encourage inventive rivalry, and
not hinder it."so Patents grant inventors control over the positive
externalities associated with their invention, as well as control over future
improvements and new uses of their invention. Granting such broad rights

174. Id.
175. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 166, at 908 (arguing that for industries involving
cumulative technologies, public policy ought to encourage a "rivalrous structure" rather than
a "race to invent" structure in order to "generate rapid technological progress").
176. Id.
177. John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theof of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 439, 49798 (2004).
178. Id.
179. See Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon, or Intellectual Property Olympian?A Normative
Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. 69, 88-90 (1999) (arguing that
trade secret law does not encourage innovation); Risch, supra note 15, at 26-27 (arguing that
"creating incentives to innovate is a very minor justification for trade secret law").
180. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 166, at 908.
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to future innovation reduces competition and, in some cases, may reduce
innovation generally.'
The monopoly control of a patent may reduce the incentive to improve
upon the patented technology. Indeed, while patents in some cases induce
invention, they may retard the commercialization and improvement of that
invention.'82 Trade secret holders, on the other hand, do not control the
future excludability of their innovation. If someone independently replicates
a secret invention, the value of the invention to the original inventor
plummets since the exclusive use of the invention is now gone. Similarly,
reverse engineering of an invention destroys trade secret excludability.
There is substantial debate in the literature about whether monopoly
power or competition provides stronger incentives to improve upon an
invention."8 However, it appears that many industries rely on competition to
spur innovation.'8 4 It is possible that the security offered by a patent may
deaden the incentive to improve the invention, whereas the incentive to
improve upon a trade secret is enhanced by the indeterminate length of
exclusivity.' The fear of independent invention and reverse engineering may
motivate trade secret holders to commercialize and improve their invention
before someone else comes up with the same idea.
John Duffy argues that patents better promote improvements than trade
secrets. Duffy proposed that the patent system functions as a type of
Demsetzian auction, in which the winner is the innovator who promises to
let the patent expire earliest.'8 6 Duffy's version of the prospect theory
accentuates and directs competition by encouraging early discovery.
According to Duffy, the patent system does not discourage competition; it
encourages competition at an extremely early stage in the innovative process.
Duffy views the ability to obtain blocking patents as a check on a patentee's
181. See, e.g., PIGOU, supra note 107.
182. See generally Sichelman, supra note 12 (arguing that the dominant theories of patent
law do not incentivize commercialization of patented inventions).
183. For differing viewpoints, compare JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,
SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 100-03 (Harpers & Row 3d ed. 1962) (1942) (arguing in favor
of monopolies) with Merges & Nelson, supra note 166 (arguing for competition).
184. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era,48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 960-62 (2001) (arguing
the internet industry relies upon competition); Howard Shelanski, Competition and Deployment
of New Technology in U.S. Telecommunications, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85 (arguing that the
telecommunications industry relies upon competition to spur innovation).
185. See Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 13, at 1060 (arguing that patents "may simply
give less incentive to improve on first-generation technology than competition for the rights
to improvements').
186. Duffy, supra note 177, at 445.
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monopoly power. He argues that "[c]ompetition to obtain, and to maintain, a
monopoly position can be harnessed to constrain the monopolist and to
increase social welfare."' 87
However, Duffy's view that blocking patents act to encourage
competition relies upon secrecy. In Duffy's view, the real competition occurs
before a patent is granted, in the period when two competitors are competing
for patent rights. In cases in which secrecy is not a viable appropriability
mechanism, Duffy is undoubtedly correct that patents encourage
competition and innovation. But in the case in which secrecy is available, it is
not clear that the patent encourages more competition than secrecy offers
organically: it likely does in some cases and does not in others. Those cases in
which it does not are likely to be the cases in which secrecy provides more
private value than patenting.
Duffy's second argument-that the existence of blocking patents
encourages patentees to improve and develop their inventions 1-rests on
certain assumptions. First, that licensing markets for blocking patents are
strong and functioning. As demonstrated in Section III.B.2, supra, such
markets do not appear to be robust.
The second assumption underlying the argument that blocking patents
encourage commercialization is that follow-on innovators are not
discouraged by the existence of a foundational patent to such a degree as to
take their research dollars elsewhere. Knowledge of an existing foundational
Even if
patent has been shown to discourage follow-on researchers.'
unknown at the time research began, such a foundational patent reduces the
profits available to a researcher since she must share her profits with the
original patentee whose work was unknown (and therefore unhelpful) to the
follow-on development. Mark Lemley also noted that the inherent
uncertainty of patent boundaries may chill further improvement by leaving

187. Id. at 490.
188. Id. at 489-90.
189. See, e.g, Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation,78 VA. L.
REv. 305, 316-21 (1992) (using rent dissipation theory to explain instances in which courts
grant broad rights to discourage follow-on innovations); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE
698 (1998) (describing potential downstream product development as an effect of
widespread patenting in the biomedical sector); Lemley, supra note 55, at 997-98 (noting that
"efficient creation of new works requires access to and use of old works"); Merges &
Nelson, supra note 166, at 843-44 (surveying historical examples in various industries to
assess the effect of patent scope on follow-on innovation).
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innovators in a patented space unclear whether they are running afoul of the
law.190
Trade secrets, on the other hand, do not diminish the incentive for
competitors to attempt to innovate. If the competitor is successful, she will
enjoy the rights to practice the invention with no fear of an infringement suit
or forced license arrangement. Trade secrecy thus leverages competition to
promote commercialization and improved innovation.
2. ReducedAdministrative Burden
The second area in which secrecy can prove more beneficial to society
than patenting is in the reduced costs that secrecy imposes on administrative
agencies. The PTO is now inundated with over 500,000 patent applications
each year. 9' This is in addition to the current backlog of over 700,000 patent
applications waiting to be examined.192 The enormous number of
applications means that each application is examined for only eighteen hours
on average.'9 3 The inability to properly examine patent applications results in
the grant of numerous invalid patents each year. Critics have not missed the
opportunity to mock the PTO for the dubious patents that it issues each

year.194
Secrets have no administrative regime, and reliance on trade secrecy to
protect an invention removes the PTO from the equation. Furthermore,
patent applications are not cheap: they cost on average $10,000 to $30,000.1"
With secrets, the money saved by not filing a patent application can be
invested towards future innovation. Thus, patent applications exact a sort of
innovation tax that trade secrecy avoids.
Perhaps even more staggering than the administrative cost of the patent
system is the cost of enforcing patent rights. Patent litigation costs upwards
of $15 billion per year to patentees and accused infringers."' An average
190. Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 13, at 1061; Mark A. Lemley & Dan L. Burk,
Quantum PatentMechanics, 9 LEWiS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 52-56 (2005).
191. See PTO, U.S. PatentStatistics, supra note 9.
192. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Patent Inventog
Statistics-FY09 (2010), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/appbacklog.jsp (reporting a
backlog of 718,835 patent applications).
193. Lemley, supranote 37, at 1496 n.3.
194. Simson Garfinkel, Patently Absurd, WIRED, July 1994, at 104; James Gleick, Patently
Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 44; Lawrence Lessig, The Problem with Patents,
THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Apr. 23, 1999, available at http://www.lessig.org/content/
standard/0,1 902,4296,00.html.
195. Lemley, supranote 37, at 1498-99 (estimating 2001 costs).
196. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 98, at 139, fig.6.5. Note that Bessen and Meurer's
numbers are likely understated. Id. at 140-41.
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patent case costs upwards of $5 million. 9 7 The public strain from patent
enforcement is quite tangible as well. Judicial resources are strained with the
complexity and time consumption of patent cases. The burden of patent
appeals was so great that in 1982 Congress created a new circuit court, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, to handle those appeals."'
Enforcing trade secrets is a much more affordable process. Trade secret
cases average around one-third the cost of a similar-sized patent case.
Lastly, trade secrets eliminate the rent-seeking behavior that patents often
attract. The large value associated with the exclusive rights in certain
technologies has resulted in a booming secondary market for the exclusivity
rights of patents. While the merits of the secondary market being used purely
for litigation are hotly debated,200 there is ample evidence that abuses of the
patent system are widespread. The so-called "troll" phenomenon, in which
parties acquire patents simply to use them as weapons in extracting licensing
fees from established companies has received ample attention in the
literature.2 0' Patent trolls have been analogized to a large innovation tax
imposed privately on certain industries.202 Trade secrets do not provide the
same opportunities for rent-seeking. Because trade secrets do not permit
exclusion of independent inventors, they do not provide any rent targets.
3.

Incentive Value

The first two categories of secrecy's potential benefits are familiar to
patent scholars. They are the benefits that accrue by avoiding the costs of
patenting. In essence, reduced administrative costs and increased competition
accrue simply by avoiding the drawbacks associated with patenting. However,
197. A trade secret litigation case in which damages are over $25 million costs around
$1-2 million to litigate. WOLF, GREENFIELD & SACKS, P.C., Q&A: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LITIGATION 10 (2009), http://www.wolfgreenfield.com/files/litigation-copy
1.pdf. A patent case with similar damages costs $5 million on average. Id. at 5.
198. See Dreyfuss, supra note 10, at 6.
199. See Lemley, supra note 6, at 331 n.81 (citing AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASs'N,
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2007, at 25-26 (2007)).
200. See, e.g., Spencer Hosie, PatentTrolls and the New Tort Reform: A Practitioner'sPerspective,
4 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'Y 75 (2008) (arguing in support of secondary patent
markets); James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the
Function ofPatentDealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 190 (2006) (same).
201. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royaly Stacking, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007) (describing holdup and royalty stacking burdens that trolls impose
on manufacturers). But see John M. Golden, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 2111, 2116 (2007) (questioning conclusions of Lemley and Shapiro).
202. See Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of
Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1810 & n.7 (2007) (noting the common claim of
trolls serving as a tax on innovation).
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secrecy's benefits are more than simply the residual benefits of foregoing
patent protection. In certain cases, secrecy can encourage innovation where
patenting cannot.
To understand the incentive to invent function of secrecy, we first must
establish that secret inventions and patented inventions often have distinct
values to their owners.203 For example, a new drug effective against migraines
is likely to be much more valuable to its owner as a patent than as a secret.
As a patent, the owner can exclude non-licensed manufacturers from
reproducing the drug and therefore charge higher prices. As a trade secret,
the drug would be subject to reverse engineering, which would likely reveal
the drug's formulation. Public knowledge of this formulation would allow
others to copy and sell the drug at a lower price.
Conversely, an innovative process of manufacturing that same drug,
involving heating certain compounds to specific temperatures before
combination, may be more valuable as a secret than as a patent. As a trade
secret, the owner will not have to pay for a patent application, nor will she
have to monitor competitors to ensure noninfringement. If she has
manufacturing capabilities, she can keep the secret confidential from all but
the employees that work at her factory. As a patent, on the other hand, she is
forced to disclose the invention to all (including her competitors) and may
not be able to detect infringement if one of those competitors infringes her
invented process.
Seen in this light, it is quite apparent that secrecy can encourage
innovation. That is, the private value of a trade secret, S, can be greater than
the private value of a patent, P. When S > P, economic theory predicts that
204
secrecy will provide greater incentives to invent than patenting. Of course,
this assumes that inventors can know ex ante the value of their future
invention. While an inventor can obviously not know such information with
exactitude, it seems likely that the relative values of the two protection
205
regimes is possible at the point of deciding between patent or trade secret.
06
Indeed, economic theories of patenting depend upon such an assumption.2
Empirical evidence suggests that when secrecy is feasible, trade secrecy
provides greater incentives to innovate than patenting. Petra Moser, in

203. See Denicol6 & Franzoni, supra note 102, at 519 (noting that inventors select the
protection that affords them the greatest scope of protection).
204. See, e.g., Vermont, supra note 30, at 489 (explaining the relationship between private
incentives to innovate and the social costs of patenting).
205. See id. at 478 ("An inventor will not pursue an invention unless her expected
revenue exceeds her expected costs of invention.").
206. Lemley, Free Riding, supranote 13, at 1054.
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examining data from the nineteenth- and twentieth-century world fairs,
concludes that only a fraction of innovations (about twelve to fifteen
percent) were patented.207 She found that patent rates vary by industry and
that variation is predicated upon the ability to protect one's innovation
through secrecy.2 " For innovations in industries that are able to maintain
secrecy, patent rates are lower than the average (around five percent). In
industries in which secrecy is less available, the rates are much higher (around
fifty percent).209
Intriguingly, Moser discovered that as reverse engineering methods in an
industry improved, patenting rates increased. Patenting rates in the chemical
industry, which had been as low as five percent between 1851 and 1876,
increased to nearly twenty percent between 1893 and 1915 as reverse
engineering became more cost-effective. 210 At the same time, other industries
in which secrecy was ineffective (such as machine manufacturing) maintained
consistently high rates of patenting.2 1' Moser's findings indicate that
inventors can determine, with some efficiency, the protection regime that will
maximize the private value of an invention.
The fact that secrecy can provide stronger incentives to invent than
patenting in certain cases is based on the tension within the reward theory
between disclosure and incentives to invent. 2 12 The tension between
disclosure and investment incentives is greatest when the disclosure itself
harms the private value of the invention. As in the case of the secret
pharmaceutical process, disclosure reduces an inventor's ability to exclude
because detection ability is inversely correlated to the ability to maintain the
invention in secret.2 13 The ability to rely on secrecy permits inventors whose
inventions are more valuable when undisclosed to maximize the value of
their invention.
In addition to secrecy's incentive function, secrecy can help balance
distortions in innovative investment that patent rights may encourage.
Scholars have long been concerned that the rents available from patent

207. Petra Moser, Why Don't Inventors Patent? 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 13294, 2007), available athttp://www.nber.org/papers/wl3294.
208. Id. at 4.
209. Id. at 37 tbl.3.
210. Id. at 3.
211. Id.
212. Holbrook, supra note 44, at 146; Strandburg, supra note 53, at 105.
213. OFFICE OF INT'L AFFAIRS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 10-12 (Mitchell B.
Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) (noting that infringement detection issues are particularly acute
with inventions maintained in secret).
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protection would inefficiently redistribute investment effort and dollars.214 If
the law could force all secret inventions to be disclosed, the investment in
those technologies that are non-self-revealing would be reduced. This result
is due to patent disclosure reducing the private value of non-self-revealing
inventions: just as a system of pure trade secrecy would create special
incentives for secret inventions, 215 a system of full disclosure creates
disincentives to invest in such inventions. In this way, the law's disclosure
requirement may induce firms to invest in technologies that are more
valuable when disclosed (patented inventions) than those that are more
valuable when kept as proprietary information (secret inventions). This has
negative consequences for society as non-self-revealing technologies with
social benefits (i.e., lower costs for goods, reduced environmental impact,
etc.) will be under-developed.
IV.

TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR SECRECY POLICY

The patent system provides a means for individuals and firms to invest
ex ante in innovative activity, while knowing that a means of recouping that
investment is potentially available ex post in the form of a patent. Such an
incentive is not required to encourage investment for all inventions, however.
For some inventions, first-mover advantage, complementary assets, secrecy,
or some other market imperfection serves as an alternate means of recouping
initial investments. The preceding Part described the societal advantages and
disadvantages involved with increased reliance on secrecy. This Part will
begin to construct a framework from which policy makers can analyze when
to prefer one type of protection scheme, and when intervention is required
to encourage inventors to make that choice.

A.

CONSTRUCTING THE FRAMEWORK
1. Private Valuation: Inventor Choice of ProtectionRegime

The same invention can have vastly different private values depending
upon the mode of protection used to protect that invention. Inventors that

214. See, e.g., JAMES W. HENDERSON, HEALTH ECONOMICS & RESEARCH POLICY 288

(4th ed. 2009) (including the distortion of research incentives among the patent system's
potential drawbacks). Of course the patent system can also direct research in socially
beneficial directions. See, e.g., PIGOu, supra note 107, at 185 (arguing that patents redirect
inventive activity into areas of general usefulness). Jonathan Barnett argues that repeat
market players may overcome some of these inefficiencies by efficiently balancing the
strength of intellectual property rights. Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation
Markets Select Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 432-33 (2009).
215. Kitch, supra note 159, at 279.

2011]1

SECRET INVENTIONS

957

choose to practice an invention in secret have determined that the invention
is worth more as a trade secret than as a patent. That is, taking into account
the private advantages (including protection from independent invention,
signaling effects, etc.) and disadvantages (including disclosure, limited
duration, cost, etc.) of a patent, the inventor has decided that she can capture
more of the value of her invention through secrecy. Various factors influence
this decision. Among the most prominent of these are the potential market
life of the invention, the feasibility of secrecy, and the likely use of the
invention. 216
First, inventors must take into account the likely lifespan of the
invention. Patents are limited to twenty years, whereas trade secrets are valid
as long as the secret is kept. The commercial lifespan consideration typically
favors choosing secrecy over patenting for both extremely long commercial
life-cycles and extremely short ones. For extremely long product cycles
measured in multiple decades, patents are less attractive because they expire
after twenty years. If an innovation promises to be valuable for a period of
time longer than twenty years, it may behoove the inventor to keep the
innovation as a secret. 217
For extremely short life cycles, patent protection is sometimes
impractical because of the delay involved in obtaining a patent. On average a
patent takes around five years to issue.2 18 After that delay, an invention's
value may be extinguished. In rapidly moving industries, patenting and its
accompanying expenses are often not attractive to inventors; the invention's
product life-cycle will end before the patent issues. Similarly, the financial
returns available from being the first product to market often dwarf any
increased returns that a patent could provide.
216. For a more complete view of the decision between patenting and secrecy, see Holly
Amjad, Patent vs. Trade Secret: Look at Costs, Industry, Returns, Bus. J. KAN. CITY, Feb. 3, 2002,
available at http://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/stories/2002/02/04/smallb3.html;
Ozzie A. Farres & Stephen T. Schreiner, Patent or Trade Secret: Which Is Better?, 124 BANKING
L.J. 274 (2007); Daniel C. Munson, The Patent-Trade Secret Decision: An IndustrialPeripective, 78
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 689 (1996); Sharon K. Sandeen, Checklistfor Choosing
Between Patentand Trade Secret Protection, 479 PLI/PAT 725 (1997).
217. Eisenberg, supra note 164, at 1029.
218. The exact average pendency is impossible to know, but Hal Wegner estimates a
sixty month pendency. Hal Wegner, Overall Patent Pendency (March 5, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). The official government estimate is a more respectable,
albeit less realistic twenty-four months. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FIsCAL YEAR 2000, at 38
(latest
(2000), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2000/00goals.pdf
available official statistics state average pendency for patent application is 25.0 months). See
generally 35 U.S.C. 5 154(b)(1)(B) (2006) (statutory guarantee that patents issue no more than
three years after filing).
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Second, inventors must analyze the feasibility of maintaining an invention
in secret. Secrecy is possible only with a limited set of inventions. Inventions
that are easily discerned via reverse engineering, or that are likely to be
developed independently, are ideal candidates for patent protection.219
Consumer products are very difficult to maintain in secret. Widespread
distribution limits an inventor's ability to meaningfully control the
downstream use of a product and prevent competitors from reverse
engineering it.2 20 Indeed, an entire "teardown" industry has sprung up that
permits cost-effective reverse engineering of even the most sophisticated
consumer products, such as iPhones.221 Products that are generally available
to competitors are unlikely to remain secret for long because once an
invention is sold or marketed, it is easily replicated.222
The concealment of a trade secret can be threatened from within as well
as from reverse engineers without. Unscrupulous employees, former business
partners, and hackers all pose risks for inventors attempting to maintain
secrets. 223 Because trade secrets must be closely guarded, the cost of
protecting them can be very high. Innovators must weigh the cost of
maintaining the secret when they decide whether or not to patent.224 Physical
security measures, employee agreements, and cyber-security can all be costly
means of protecting an invention; a cost that may be greater than the cost of
obtaining legal protection through the patent system.
Patents, on the other hand, require disclosure. Not only does a patent
describe the manner of practicing an invention, it alerts competitors to the
invention's existence.225 Competitors alerted to a patented method are free to
"design around" the invention and bring competing products or processes to

219. See Moser, supranote 207, at 1.
220. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret
Protection:A Legal andBusiness Decision, 84J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 371, 386 (2002).
221. The Lowdown on Teardowns, THE EcONOMIST, Jan. 21, 2010, at 62, 63.
222. The rise of a sophisticated reverse-engineering regime has led some commentators
to claim that it is now virtually impossible to maintain inventions in secret. See Mazzone &
Moore, supra note 6, at 35; see also Holbrook, supra note 44, at 134 (stating that the set of nonself-disclosing inventions is "small"). This argument, however, tends to focus on inventions
that are contained within commercially available consumer products. While it is true that
certain inventions, particularly products, are often impossible to conceal once they are sold,
other types of inventions, such as chemical and industrial processes, are not disclosed to the
public when the final product is sold. Many processes are not revealed in the products that
they create; the very existence of the process may be undetectable.
223. This is not a new phenomenon. See Victor M. Harding, Trade Secrets and the Mobile
Emplojee, 22 Bus. LAW. 395 (1967).
224. Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 220, at 382.
225. Id. at 384.
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the market.226 In contrast, if the invention is maintained as a secret,
competitors may not know of the existence of the invention, let alone the
manner of practicing the invention for themselves.
However, disclosure of an invention can be desirable to certain inventors.
A patented invention can signal to competitors that a particular area of
technology has been cornered. This may discourage other companies from
investing in the same invention because the patent prevents any future
developments in that space.227 Similarly, Clarisa Long theorized that patents
are often used as a signal of innovative activity at a firm. 228 Under Long's
theory, firms may desire the disclosure of a patent because it enables them to
attract investment from investors who rely upon patents as a signal of
innovative strength.
Disclosure is also desirable when an inventor wants to widely market,
sell, or license her innovation. The patent system's ability to overcome
Arrow's paradox-one will not pay for an invention that isn't disclosed-has
long been heralded by commentators. 229 Disclosure of trade secrets, while
permitted, is more costly and limited than with patents.23 0 Secrecy is
impractical when exploitation of the invention requires impersonal
communication to a large number of firms.2 31
Inventions that are easily maintained in secret are ilso likely to be
infringed in secret.232 Thus, the ability to maintain an invention in secret has
two important roles in determining the proper means of appropriation: it
allows an inventor to enjoy a competitive advantage for a potentially limitless
time period, and it reduces the value of a patent on that invention because
the cost of detecting infringement is increased.
Lastly, in deciding upon invention protection, inventors must take into
account the likely use of any new invention. As detailed above, inventions
embodied in consumer products are often poor candidates for secrecy. If the
business model for an innovation calls for widespread licensing, rather than
in-house use, patent protection may make more sense than secrecy.233 On the
226. For more on the ability to design around, see S. Glazier, Inventing Around Your
Competitors'Patents,MANAGING INTELL. PROP., July/August 1995, at 10.
227. This idea has been explored thoroughly in the literature on the prospect theory of
patent law. See generaly Duffy, supra note 177, at 476; Kitch, supra note 159, at 267-71.
228. Clarisa Long, PatentSignals, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 625, 627-28 (2002).
229. Arrow, supra note 104, at 614-16; Eisenberg, supra note 164, at 1029.
230. Lemley, supra note 6, at 314.
231. WARD S. BOWMAN JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW 13 (1973).
232. Oddi, supra note 115, at 285 n.126 (stating that because process patent infringement
is difficult to detect, processes are ideal candidates for trade secret protection).
233. Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 220, at 403.
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other hand, products and processes which are to be used in the internal
workings of a company are much more likely to have value as secrets.
2. ComparingPrivate and Public Preference
While the factors involved in any individual inventor's decision of
whether to patent are quite complex, in general we can say that inventors will
choose secrecy when the expected return from secrecy exceeds the expected
return from patenting. If we define S as the value of a trade secret and P as
the value of a patented invention, we expect inventors to choose secrecy
when S > P. S represents the value to the inventor of the invention as a
secret, taking into account the risks and costs of secrecy as detailed above. In
other words, S equals the increased profit one can expect from using the
invention if kept secret forever reduced by some function accounting for the
potential discovery of the secret. P, on the other hand, represents the
increased profit to be expected over the twenty-year life of the patent
(including any licensing royalties), minus enforcement costs and patent fees.
Let us introduce a third variable, R, which represents the cost of
researching, developing, and commercializing the invention. R represents the
revenue that must be generated by the invention to allow the inventor to
recoup her upfront costs. Generally, when the expected return from either
secrecy or patenting exceeds R, the invention will be produced; conversely,
when S and P are both less than R, the invention will not be produced. That
is, when R > P or S, a potential inventor will not expend the necessary effort
to produce the invention because she will not recoup her upfront research
costs. Four scenarios in which theory predicts that inventive effort will be
expended deserve our attention. I label those scenarios Public Goods,
Reverse Public Goods, Valuable Secret, and Valuable Patent. The scenarios
are analyzed in more detail in Section IV.B, infra.
B.

FRAMEWORK SUMMARY

The chart below summarizes the secrecy framework described in this
section:
Scenario

Private Valuation

Inventor Preference

Societal Preference

Public Goods

P> R> S

Patent

Patent

S> RS> P

Trade Secret

Trade Secret

Valuable Secret

S> P> R

Trade Secret

Trade Secret

Valuable Patent

P> S> R

Patent

Trade Secret

Reverse Public
Goods

The framework revolves around two primary assumptions. First, private
inventors will choose the intellectual property protection that offers the
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greatest private value. Thus, if at the moment of selection, trade secrecy
appears to offer the greater private reward, an inventor will choose to
maintain her invention in secret. Conversely, if patent protection appears to
offer the greatest private reward, patenting will be selected as the
appropriation mechanism.
Second, societal preference is premised upon an innovation regime that
primarily encourages innovation and secondarily reduces social costs. Thus,
society prefers the appropriation regime that incentivizes creation of
innovative devices and methods. When innovation is incentivized under both
patent and trade secrecy, society prefers to offer the protection regime that
carries the lowest social burden. For reasons described herein, I conclude
that trade secrecy carries lower social costs than patenting.
The framework suggests that policy makers ought to be more concerned
with encouraging the use of secrecy, rather than discouraging it. Policy
makers need not concern themselves with influencing decisions in the
scenarios in which inventor preference coincides with public preference.234
Contrary to contemporary understanding, secrecy does not need to be
discouraged by patent law. In fact, the one case where the socially optimal
selection differs from the expected inventor selection suggests the need for a
policy that creates incentive to keep an invention as a trade secret.
Thus, secrecy policy should be motivated by two primary concerns. First,
the use of trade secrecy need not be discouraged. The public goods scenario
is the only situation in which secrecy is not the socially preferred method of
protection. Because of the existence of the patent system, inventors will seek
patents on such inventions without any intervention from policy makers.
Second, in a small set of cases-when P > S > R-secrecy should be
encouraged. The following section outlines ways in which the two policy
objectives suggested by the secrecy framework might be employed.
1. The Public Goods Scenario
The reward theory's incentive to invent is generally concerned with the
public goods market failure.235 The public goods scenario occurs when the
expected return from secrecy is less than the cost of development and the
expected return from patenting exceeds development costs, or P > R > S. In
this case, we would not expect innovation to occur without the patent
234. Trusting individuals in valuation decisions instead of courts is the primary
justification scholars have offered for injunctive relief in patent cases. See ROBERT P.
MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 297-99 (3d

ed. 2003).
235. See e.g., Holbrook, supra note 44, at 132; Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 13, at 1053.

962

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26:917

system. Secrecy alone is insufficient to induce investment because the
inventor will not be able to recoup her initial investment. The promise of a
patent, however, is sufficient to induce investment. This scenario is the only
one of the four that involves the production problems associated with public
goods.
The public goods scenario occurs quite frequently. This scenario likely
describes the majority of patented product inventions, which tend to be
difficult to conceal and therefore easily copied. For example, Chester
Carlson's invention of the Xerox machine required large investments in the
then novel field of imaging technology.23 6 Had Carlson maintained his
invention as a trade secret, it would have been possible for a competitor to
reverse engineer the xerography process once the machines were sold
publicly. A copyist could have offered a lower priced alternative since she
would have avoided the research costs incurred by Carlson. Of course, he
avoided the free riding problem by obtaining a number of patents covering
his technology.237 Patenting enabled him to exclude others from practicing
his invention and thus charge supranormal prices in order to recoup
investment costs. 238
The public goods scenario is the primary economic justification for the
existence of the patent system. 23 This scenario describes the classic
economic win-win: inventors benefit by being able to recoup investment
costs and the public benefits by receiving new technologies that are disclosed
for public consumption.
In this scenario, inventor preference is aligned with societal preference.
When secrecy does not provide sufficient means of recouping investment,
rational inventors will choose to patent their inventions. Society prefers
patenting in the public goods scenario because reliance upon secrecy results
in reduced investment in and production of innovation. Thus, the mere
existence of the patent system will encourage investment in and disclosure of
novel innovations. There is no justification for discouraging secrecy in this
case because rational inventors will independently make the socially optimal
choice-patenting.

236. See generally DAVID OWEN, COPIES IN SECONDS: CHESTER CARLSON AND THE
BIRTH OF THE XEROX MACHINE (2004) (describing the large investments made in the
invention of the Xerox machine).
237. Id. at 141 (noting that Carlson received forty total patents on xerography).
238. See id. at 288-89 (describing the potential competitors "lining up to sue" over
Carlson's patent misuse).
239. See, e.g., Holbrook, supranote 44, at 132.
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2. The Reverse Public Goods Scenario
Certain inventions, particularly process inventions, are significantly more
valuable to inventors as secrets than the same invention would be if patented.
At times, the protection offered by secrecy can provide a means of
appropriating an invention and recouping the invention's investment costs
while the same invention, if disclosed as a patent, would not provide an
inventor with sufficient incentive to innovate. I name this scenario the
"reverse public goods scenario." In the reverse public goods scenario,
mandated disclosure (if possible) would lead to the underproduction of
certain inventions, namely those inventions in which infringement detection
would be difficult and therefore trade secrecy more valuable. 240 Infringement
detection is difficult for some of the same reasons that secrecy is appealing:
the marketed product or service does not reveal the underlying technology.
The reverse public goods scenario is defined as S > R > P.
In the reverse public goods case, as in the classic economic case of public
goods, free riders would drive down the cost of an invention, reducing the
ability of the innovator to recoup costs. 241 However, in this case it is the
disclosure of the invention, not reverse engineering, that provides the free
riding opportunity.
Chemical manufacturing methods are an example of the reverse public
goods scenario. These methods are often undetectable to a potential reverse
engineer.242 Thus, if the innovator of a new type of process chooses to
patent, competitors could use the process in secret with little fear of
detection and subsequent infringement suits. Because of the difficulty in
detecting infringement, companies tend to maintain such processes as secrets
rather than disclose them through the patent office. If these inventions were
somehow forcibly disclosed, inventors would choose to invest less in those
technologies where private value is undermined by disclosure, resulting in
less innovation and ultimately less disclosure.
The reverse public goods scenario does not occur under current law
because of the appropriability that secrecy provides. Thus, because inventors
are not forced to patent (and disclose) their inventions, they are free to
maintain inventions as trade secrets and rational actors will do precisely that.
Society has a preference for these inventions remaining as secrets for
precisely the same reasons that patenting is preferred in the public goods

240. PIGOU, supranote 107, at 185.
241. See, e.g., Holbrook, supranote 44, at 132; Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 13, at 1053.
242. Lemley, supra note 6, at 339 (noting that chemical processes are not transparent to
the world).
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scenario: in a world of full disclosure, certain inventions would be
suboptimally produced, thereby reducing overall innovation. Again, this
scenario does not present a justification for discouraging secrecy. In fact
secrecy is the socially optimal choice in this scenario. Fortunately, rational
inventors will make that choice as well.
3. The Valuable Secret Scenatio
A third scenario presents a more difficult case in determining whether to
incentivize trade secrets or patents. There are cases in which both patenting
and secrecy promise returns greater than investment costs. In some of those
cases the expected returns from a trade secret exceed the expected returns
from a patent, or S > P > R Patent doctrines designed to discourage secrecy
are primarily concerned with this scenario.2 43 Here, the patent system
provides enough of an expected return to encourage innovation, just not as
large of a return as secrecy. Secrecy will be the preferred method of
appropriation for rational inventors in this scenario. Traditional treatments of
this scenario have tended to prefer patenting, as described in Section IV.A,
supra.
The Kewanee case is an example of the valuable trade secret scenario. The
valuable innovation involved in Harshaw Chemical's 17-inch radiationdetecting crystal was the process used in manufacturing and growing the
crystal.244 Harshaw likely would have been able to profit from its invention if
patented because discovering a 17-inch crystal in radiation-detection
products would likely constitute prima facie evidence of infringement,
assuming no other methods of growing such crystals were known. However,
for reasons which are unclear from the published opinion, Harshaw's
leadership felt that maintaining the method of crystal growth as a trade secret
would provide more private value for the company. This may be because the
market for such crystals was relatively small, detection of the use of such
crystals would be prohibitively expensive, or for some other reason.
Maximizing public value in this case is more complicated than in the
previous two scenarios because the primary concern of the patent systemstimulating innovation-is not a concern: both the patent system and trade
secrecy promise a return on innovative investment. In this Section, I suggest
that secrecy is socially optimal in the valuable secrets scenario. Secrets exhibit
numerous benefits over patents in this scenario. First, reliance on trade
243. See Eisenberg, supra note 164, at 1072 (stating that the quid pro quo only concerns
this scenario).
244. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 473 (1974). Harshaw spent over $1
million in developing its crystal. Id.
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secrecy reduces the administrative costs of innovation. Second, secrecy
encourages competition in both innovation and commercialization. Third,
secrecy provides a natural market mechanism of inducing inventive activity.
Fourth, the use of trade secrecy when available leads to increased incentives
to invent in the future. Furthermore, deadweight losses from secrecy will
attract competitors whereas patents will discourage competition. The
unencumbered ability to innovate in innovative areas that are protected as
trade secrets encourages competitors to reduce the deadweight losses in
circumstances in which those losses are excessive.
Trade secrecy avoids some of the costs associated with patenting, namely
administrative costs and the costs to future innovators of navigating patent
entitlements.24 5 Trade secrecy often involves some sort of disclosure.24 6
However, the deadweight losses from a secret invention in this scenario are
likely to be higher than those from patenting. Deadweight losses refer to the
losses that result from certain consumers who would purchase the invention
at the marginal price being priced out of the market due to the exclusionary
power of the producer.247 Because higher private value signals the ability to
charge higher prices, we should expect secrecy to result in greater deadweight
losses than patenting in this scenario.248
However, the societal advantages of trade secrets over patents may
overcome the greater deadweight losses on the margins. For those cases in
which deadweight losses are much greater for secrets than patents, the large
relative private value of the secret invention is unlikely to be overcome by
small policy tweaks. Encouraging such privately valuable inventions to be
patented would likely require eliminating secrecy completely in such cases, an
obvious impossibility. Additionally, it should be noted that because trade
secrecy does not restrict competition, we should expect market forces to
counteract somewhat any deadweight losses that arise from secrecy. Whereas
patents create deadweight losses and restrict competitors from attempting to
lower those losses, trade secrecy likely attracts competitors due to the lack of
competitive restrictions.
Furthermore, there is little economic justification for granting patents in
this scenario, let alone preferring them to trade secrets. Patent law is designed
245. See Vermont, supra note 30, at 490-92 (classifying the costs associated with granting
patents as monopoly losses, rent dissipation, and miscellaneous costs).
246. See Sandeen, supra note 71, at 344.
247. See, e.g., WILLIAM NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WELFARE: A
THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969) (recognizing that the
creation of intellectual property rights in innovation will lead to deadweight loss as a result of
monopoly pricing).
248. See Denicol6 & Franzoni, supra note 102, at 530-34.
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to overcome a particular market failure-free riding on information. 249 The
valuable secret scenario does not present such a market failure.
In addition to secrecy's incentive and competitive benefits, permitting
inventors to select secrecy in this case has innovative benefits. Economists
have developed economic models that demonstrate that overall investment is
reduced when patent strength is increased for inventions in which secrecy is
a viable option. Illoong Kwon showed that when the patent propensity (the
ratio of innovations for which patent protection is sought) is less than one,
"strengthening patent protection always decreases research investment." 2 50 This
result holds for both models involving single innovations5 as well as
cumulative innovations.252 Kwon's models support the theoretical model of
this Article and also have an intuitive explanation. As patent protection
becomes stronger, firms will increasingly prefer patents even when ex ante
expected profits would be greater under a secrecy regime because they will
have a "strong incentive to apply for patents in order to exclude the other
firms from the product market." 253 Thus, widespread patenting in an industry
incentivizes inventors to increasingly rely on patent protection, thereby
reducing the value of those inventions that can be maintained in secret. The
reduced value in turn reduces the ex ante incentive to invest in innovation.
4. The Valuable PatentScenario
The final scenario describes situations in which both patenting and trade
secrecy provide sufficient incentives to innovate, but a patented invention
has more private value than a secret. In other words, when P > S > R There
are a number of real-life scenarios in which secrecy alone is sufficient to
propel an innovator to create, but patenting provides a higher potential
return on the initial investment.
Many patented inventions likely fall within this scenario. For instance,
several methods of financial investing would be appropriable as either trade
254
For years such financial methods were largely
secrets or as patents.25

249. See, e.g., Holbrook, supra note 44, at 132; Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 13, at 1053.
250. Illoong Kwon, Patent Portfolio Races and Secrecy 3 (2009) (unpublished
manuscript), http://www.albany.edu/~ik325357/Research/Portfolio.pdf.
251. Illoong Kwon, Secrecy and the Fallacy of Patent Protection 2-3 (2010)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.albany.edu/-ik325357/Research/Fallacy.pdf.
252. Id.
253. Kwon, supra note 250, at 23.
254. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 1015 (2003) (noting that the change to business method
patentability has led to worries that methods maintained as trade secrets would now be
patented).
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maintained as trade secrets; companies that developed superior methods
were rewarded when their investments earned higher profits than those of
their competitors.2 55 After State Street Bank &'. Trust Co. v. Signature Financial
Group, Inc. established the patentability of such methods, many financial
institutions began patenting some of their inventive method innovations that
would have been maintained as secrets prior to State Street.256 In other words,
some financial innovations promised more private value for their creators as
patents than as secrets. Much of this added value likely came from a patent's
ability to exclude competitors from practicing the invention. There is little
reason, however, to think that these methods were insufficiently incentivized
prior to State Street. Rather, once offered the choice, the institutions felt that
patenting held greater promise for earning profit than did trade secrecy.257
However, the social value of financial institutions rushing to patent
methods that a decade earlier would have been maintained in secret is likely
negative: patenting in this scenario involves greater deadweight losses,5
higher administrative costs, 25 9 and potentially decreased incentives to
commercialize.260 All of these costs come with no increase in innovation,
because secrecy alone would have provided (and once did provide) sufficient
incentives to create.
Secrecy, on the other hand, provides the same innovation at a lower cost
to society. Furthermore, it enables competition in innovation to flourish,
likely resulting in improved products and better incentives to commercialize
quickly. Indeed, prior to State Street, there was no shortage of inventive
financial methods. Competition among rivals ensured that new and
innovative financial methods would continue to be developed. Companies
protected their investment in such methods through a variety of methods
such as marketing, first-mover advantage, and secrecy. The introduction of
wide-spread patenting into the field has created uncertainty as to rights
clearance as well as a new competitor, the so-called "patent troll."

255. Kwon, supranote 250, at 4.
256. Id.; Josh Lerner, Where Does State Street Lead? A First Look at FinancePatents, 1971 to
2000, 57 J. FIN. 901, 906-07 (2002) (noting the increasing acceleration of finance patents
over time); see also State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
257. See Lerner, supra note 256, at 906-07.
258. F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 449-50 (3d ed. 1990) (documenting excess pricing of patented products).
259. Many of the costs that Vermont refers to as "miscellaneous costs." Vermont, supra
note 30, at 492.
260. See Sichelman, supra note 12.
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Trade secrecy avoids many of the social costs that wide-spread patenting
creates. However, rational individuals and companies will continue to choose
to patent their inventions in cases where patenting provides more private
value than secrecy. Unlike the first three scenarios, public value is maximized
by encouraging inventors to choose an intellectual property regime that
reduces private value. Thus, encouraging inventors to rely on trade secrecy in
the valuable patents scenario should be the focus of policy makers.
Patent doctrine and rhetoric regarding secret inventions has been
concerned with discouraging inventors from choosing secrecy. This focus,
however, is misplaced. As shown above, when rational inventors prefer trade
secrecy (when a trade secret provides more private value), that choice is
socially optimal (it provides the largest social value).26 ' Instead of
discouraging secrecy, policy makers and courts should adopt policies that
encourage secrecy in the limited set of circumstances when P > S > R_
5. Framework Caveats
The framework is subject to a number of caveats. First, the framework
involves rough ex ante estimates of private invention value. These values are
difficult to determine ex ante. They involve calculations of the odds of
success as well as predictions of market demand-values which are very
difficult to predict with precision. However, it is likely that many inventors
can make at least some determination of relative future value.262 Indeed, the
reward theory generally presumes that inventors can determine the relative
value of a potential invention and the cost of creation. 263 The framework
constructed in this Article merely adds a third value, S, to the fundamental
framework of the reward theory. Inventors who can determine, on some
level, expected patented returns likely can make an estimation of expected
trade secrecy returns as well.
Another potential drawback to the framework is that the economic
rationale underlying the framework (and patent theory generally) assumes
perfectly rational actors. While those assumptions have been questioned
elsewhere, their support (or lack thereof) is beyond the scope of this

261. The social value of a patented invention, of course, is dependent on the social value
derived from the disclosure of that invention. For purposes of this Article, it is assumed that
the social value of disclosure, standing alone, is less than the social cost of a patent. If one
places more value on the social benefit of patent disclosure, this conclusion may change.
262. Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 13, at 1064; see also, Vermont, supra note 30, at 499500 (assuming inventors can value future invention value relative to research costs in both a
world with and a world without an independent invention defense).
263. Vermont, supra note 30, at 499-500.
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Article.264 Such assumptions of future value and rational actors lie at the heart
of patent theory.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly from a policy perspective, the
determinations depend upon one's valuation of patent disclosure. I have
detailed the reasons for doubting the societal value of patent disclosure alone
in Section III.B.1, supra. My view on the limited public value of patent
disclosure is not unique. 265 However, reasonable minds can, and do, differ on
this subject.2 66 The value one places on patent disclosure may affect the
societal value associated with the differing modes of protection. If one
believes that patent disclosure, standing alone, has a large societal value, the
public value discussion in this Article's valuable patent scenario may be
altered. A view of strong patent disclosure value may suggest encouraging
patents when patented inventions have a larger private value than a secret
invention.
C.

EMPLOYING THE FRAMEWORK

Moving towards a more theoretical framework for encouraging the use of
secrecy requires certain changes to the doctrines of patent law. Before
delving into the changes suggested by this Article's framework, it is
important to note the rhetoric employed by courts. In intellectual property
law, the choice of rhetoric employed to embody legal concepts has
2671h
consequences.
Courts have consistently elevated the patent quid pro quo
beyond merely an option for inventors; it has become a de facto social policy.
Little effort has been made to theoretically support the discouragement of
secrecy and, as detailed above, policy makers should in fact prefer precisely
the opposite result in certain cases. Courts would be better served by
couching their examination of the patent bargain in language suggesting
patents as a means of encouraging innovation rather than eliminating secret
inventions.

264. For more on the problem of assuming perfectly rational actors in law, see Robert
C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to RationalActors:A Critique of ClassicalLaw and
Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23 (1989).
265. See generally Fromer, supra note 133 (suggesting ways to improve the disclosure
system, while acknowledging the limited current value of disclosure); Holbrook, supra note
44 (noting the paradoxical elements of patent doctrine that discourage disclosure).
266. See generally Kitch, supra note 159 (arguing for a new theory of patent law based
upon the signaling value of patent disclosure).
267. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents?
Reevaluating the Patent 'Privilege" in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007)
(investigating the role of courts referencing Thomas Jefferson's views of patent law).
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1. Reversing the DoctrinesAgainst Secrecy

Current patent doctrine attempts to influence innovator choice by
discouraging secrecy. In a broad sense, one could consider any doctrine that
strengthens patent protection to discourage secrecy. For example, if patent
duration were to be increased from twenty to forty years, some inventors at
the margins would undoubtedly be enticed to consider patenting over trade
secrecy. This interplay between patent strength and the appeal of trade
secrecy is inevitable and unavoidable. However, there are two groups of
doctrines whose sole function is to discourage secrecy. This Section suggests
changes to those doctrines that would better align patent doctrine with the
policies outlined above.
a) Prior User Rights
Prior user rights are rights for first inventors to practice their invention
regardless of whether the invention has been subsequently patented by
another.2 68 The lack of prior user rights encourages patenting by placing trade
secret holders at risk of losing the right to practice their own invention.
Indeed, commentators view the discouragement of trade secrecy as the
strongest argument for denying prior user rights.269 For example, some
commentators have argued that the law correctly permits a patentee to
exclude a first inventor from practicing her invention because such a risk of
exclusion will encourage patenting.270
However, as shown above, discouraging secrecy does not have
theoretical support as a policy objective. Refusing to grant prior user rights
creates a sense of fear among trade secret holders and an inevitable push
towards the patent system. Even critics of prior user rights have noted that
while prior user rights decrease the incentive to patent, they likely increase
271
the overall incentive to innovate.

268. See, eg., James R. Barney, The PriorUser Defense: A Reprievefor Trade Secret Owners or a
Disasterfor Patent Law?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y. 261 (2000) (describing the
debate around prior user rights); Lisa M. Brownlee, Trade Secret Use of Patentable Inventions,
Prior User Rights and Patent Law HarmoniZation: An Analysis and Proposal, 72 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 523 (1990) (detailing the existence of prior user rights in foreign
jurisdictions).
269. See Barney, supra note 268 (concluding that prior user rights would harm the public
in part due to diminished disclosure); Shapiro, supra note 5, at 95.
270. Denicolo & Franzoni, supra note 102, at 517.
271. Id. at 529-30 (finding that in a system with prior user rights, the incentive to
innovate is strengthened, although the incentive to patent is reduced).
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Carl Shapiro has argued for the establishment of prior user rights. 2 72 He
has posited that prior user rights enhance competition, reward innovation,
and can partially correct problems caused by patents of questionable
validity. 273 While I agree with Shapiro, this Article suggests an additional
ground which supports prior user rights: granting prior user rights would
more closely harmonize the law with the economic rationale underlying
patent theory.
On the other hand, Vincenzo Denicol6 and Luigi Franzoni have argued
that prior user rights should be denied because society prefers patenting over
secrecy in cases in which an inventor would prefer trade secrecy.274 They
argue that because greater deadweight losses occur when secrecy provides a
greater benefit to the inventor, society should prefer patenting. However,
Denicol6 and Franzoni admit that denying prior user rights "reduces the
incentives to innovate." 275 This is true because discouraging secrecy can
decrease overall incentives to invest.
Since 1999, U.S. law has provided for some prior user rights for patents
on business methods.276 Congress is considering further legislation that
would greatly expand prior user rights.277 The business method exception for
prior user rights, while desirable, does not go far enough to align patent
doctrine with the reward theory. A better solution would be to grant blanket
prior user rights to first inventors. Doing so would place holders of patented
inventions and trade secrets on equal footing: patentees would be able to
exclude others from using a patented invention, except for those inventors
that invented prior to the patent application. Similarly, trade secret holders
could operate knowing that later-filed patents would not subject them to
infringement liability or the inability to practice their own invention.
b) Priority Rules and the One-Year Statutory Bar to Patentability
A subsequent inventor can obtain patent rights over a first inventor if the
second inventor can show that the first inventor "abandoned, suppressed, or
concealed" the invention at any time after the second inventor successfully

272. The law's lack of prior user rights has been criticized by commentators on the
grounds of being unfair and for economic reasons. See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 95 (finding
that prior user rights enhance competition, reward innovation with relatively little deadweight loss, and more properly align the private and social incentives of innovation).
273. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 93.
274. Denicol6 & Franzoni, supra note 102, at 530-34.
275. Id.
276. 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006).
277. Patent Reform Act, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009).
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reduced the invention to practice. 278 An invention is considered abandoned,
suppressed, or concealed if an inventor fails to patent the invention within a
reasonable period of time.279 Courts weigh various factors when determining
whether a delay in patenting is reasonable, but commercialization activities
are not valid reasons for delay.280 Courts have determined that
commercialization means any commercial use, including use that is not
observable by the public. 2 81
The priority rule of Section 102 (g) favors inventors who aggressively seek
patent protection over those who practice inventions secretly for a time. An
inventor who conceals her invention faces the risk of losing the patent rights
in her invention to a subsequent patentee and is thus encouraged to patent,
even if the information available at the time of selection indicates that secrecy
would provide sufficient return on investment.2 82
Along with the lack of prior user rights, the priority doctrine is a threat to
inventors who practice in secret. Whereas priority rules threaten the potential
exclusive rights, the lack of prior user rights threatens the complete ability to
practice an invention. The latter threat is potentially more worrisome for
both an inventor and from an equity perspective, 283 but under current law the
two go hand-in-hand. The loss of a priority battle means that one loses both
the right to patent and the ability to practice the invention.
278. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (g) (2006).
279. See I CHIsUM, supra note 89, § 10.08[1].
280. Id.
281. E.g., Lutzker v. Plet, 843 F.2d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[W]hen there is an
unreasonable delay between the actual reduction to practice and the filing of a patent
application, there is a basis for inferring abandonment, suppression or concealment.... The
inventor's activities during the delay period may excuse the delay (e.g., he may have worked
during that period to improve or perfect the invention disclosed in the patent
application).... When, however, the delay is caused by working on refinements and
improvements which are not reflected in the final patent application, the delay will not be
excused. . . . Further, when the activities which cause the delay go to commercialization of
the invention, the delay will not be excused.").
282. Priority rules also serve to limit an inventor's ability to extend the exclusivity period
of an invention by tacking on a twenty-year patent term just as trade secrecy is expiring. See
Pencock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1829) (stating that allowing such term extension
would "materially retard the progress of science and the useful arts"). One potential way of
altering priority rules to both reward first invention and reduce "double-dipping" would be
to reduce the patent term by the term of trade secret usage. Additionally, by granting broad
prior user rights, a system in which patent priority is lost is less burdensome because patent
rights would not restrict an original inventor from practicing her invention.
283. See Dunlop Holdings, Ltd. v. Ram Golf Corp., 524 F.2d 33, 36 n. 11 (7th Cir. 1975)
("For it is less serious to hold that the first inventor has forfeited his right to a patent
monopoly than it is to hold that he has forfeited any right to use his own invention without
the permission of a subsequent inventor.").
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Rather than focus on the public or private nature of an innovation,
priority disputes ought to turn on the issue for which they were created: who
invented first. First reduction to practice should be the primary concern of
priority disputes. Rewarding the first inventor rather than the first non-secret
inventor has both an intuitive equitable appeal, 28 4 as well as an economic
appeal, as a means of encouraging commercialization of trade secrets.
Currently, commercialization activities which delay the filing of a patent may
be considered suppression of an invention. The law should encourage such
commercializing activities by awarding priority to the de facto first
inventor.2 86
2. EncouragingSecrecy: PotentialSteps
The law does not currently encourage inventors to maintain inventions as
trade secrets. As described in this Part, however, economic theory suggests
that at least in certain situations, it should. In general, we can assume that
inventor choice will mirror the socially optimal choice. However, when a
patented invention is more valuable than a trade secret and secrecy promises
a sufficient return on investment, society should encourage secrecy. This final
Section will begin to describe different ways in which secrecy can be actively
encouraged as well as potential drawbacks from employing these changes.
a) Encouraging Secrecy Through Patent Law
When research costs are low, it can be assumed that S and P will both be
greater than R. That is, as R approaches zero, both secrecy and patenting
provide sufficient return on investment to induce invention. When that is the
case, this Article's framework suggests that policy makers should encourage
the use of trade secrecy. Often, inventors will prefer patenting in such cases
because the risk of independent invention or reverse engineering is very high
when research costs are minimal.
James Anton and Dennis Yao demonstrated that inventors of low-cost
innovations will often rely on patent protection. They developed models that
284. See id.
285. See In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 675-76 (Fed. Cit. 1985) (stating that sale of the
product of a secret method triggers the on-sale bar).
286. The law regarding priority (and novelty in general) was recently modified via
legislation. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3, §§ 101, 102
(enacted Sept. 16, 2011). Beginning eighteen months after the enactment of the America
Invents Act, priority to invention will be judged based upon the filing date of the patent
application rather than the date of invention. Id. sec. 3(n). The move to a first-to-file system
will harmonize U.S. patent law with the rest of the world and alleviate some of the concerns
discussed above for applications filed after that date. For inventions filed before March
2013, however, the old priority rules still apply.
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demonstrate that innovators will tend to seek patents for smaller,
incremental, less valuable developments.287 This behavior can be explained by
the fact that these innovations are unlikely to be imitated, thus full disclosure
does not harm the innovator.288
Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine ex ante which types of
inventions require low investment and which do not. Much to the chagrin of
economists, patent law does not concern itself with the amount of
investment required to produce an innovation. Patent law's obviousness
doctrine could potentially provide some help in this area. Further work on
the obviousness doctrine's ability to weed out low-cost innovation could
prove helpful in implementing the framework proposed in this Article.
Another potential means of encouraging the use of secrecy is to deny
patents altogether to inventions that could have been maintained as trade
secrets and thus do not require the patent system to encourage their creation.
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides a means, albeit a heavy-handed one,
of restricting the types of inventions that can be patented.2 89 Any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter can be
patented as long as it meets the other requirements of the Patent Act and
does not fall under one of the non-patentable categories created by the
Supreme Court, such as abstract ideas.290
David Olson proposed eliminating patent protection for business
methods for utilitarian reasons. As Olson notes, the ability to accurately
differentiate a specific class of inventions from another is requisite for
effective use of Section 101 as a policy lever.2 91 In the case of secret
inventions, however, it is unlikely that subject matter categories will
differentiate those inventions that could be profitably maintained in secret
from those that cannot.
For example, consider one potential manner of distinguishing invention
types: products and methods. Inventions appropriable through secrecy tend

287. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, iUttle Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual
Property, 35 RAND J. ECON. 1, 3 (2004).
288. Id. at 11-13.
289. See 35 U.S.C. 5 101 (2006); David S. Olson, Taking the UtilitarianBasisfor PatentLaw
Seriousy: The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REv. 181, 184 (2009)
(arguing that the subject matter of inventions eligible for patenting "has developed with little
explicit consideration of the utilitarian question").
290. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). See generally Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)
(holding a patent on a method of hedging risk invalid as an "abstract idea").
291. See Olson, supranote 289, at 184.
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to be methods or processes and not products.292 Products are, in general,
subject to easier reverse engineering than are methods that can be performed
in secret. Particular types of methods, such as manufacturing methods,
chemical methods, and certain types of software are examples of inventions
that are generally appropriable through secrecy. 293 However, the
method/product distinction is an imperfect measure of the viability of
secrecy. Certain types of method innovations are difficult to appropriate
through secrecy; inventors of such methods depend on the patent system in
order to obtain a return on their investment in the innovation. The blunt use
of Section 101 to eliminate patentability on all, or a specific class, of methods
is likely to result in reduced innovation in areas that would be socially
beneficial.
b) Encouraging Secrecy Through Trade Secret Law: Secret
Invention Registry
Another potential manner of encouraging secrecy involves modifying the
existing system of trade secrecy. Trade secret law poses certain difficulties f6r
inventors. Among the drawbacks of trade secret law from an inventor's
perspective are the uncertainty of trade secret scope294 and the potential loss
of the right to practice one's invention if later patented.295 One potential
means of encouraging the use of secrecy is to reduce the uncertainty of those
aspects of trade secret law.
As an initial step towards encouraging secrecy, a trade secret registry
could be created. A trade secret registry would overcome one of the majdr
drawbacks of litigating the misappropriation of trade secrecy: proving that a
secret exists in the first place.296 In general it can be said that proving the
existence of a trade secret requires three elements: proof that the subject
matter is not generally known, proof that reasonable efforts were taken by
the owner to protect the secret, and proof that secrecy confers an economic
advantage on the holder.297

292. See Oddi, supra note 115, at 285 n.126 (noting that processes are particularly good
candidates for trade secret protection); see also Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent
Districts: Observationson the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REv. 359, 376-77 (1992).
293. See Merges, supra note 292.
294. See James Pooley, The Top Ten Issues in Trade Secret Law, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 1181,
1181-82 (1997) (stating that the definitional problem of trade secret litigation is one of the
most pressing issues of the law).
295. See supra Section IV.C.1.a.
296. See, e.g., Pooley, supra note 294, at 1181-85 (noting that much litigation centers
around whether a secret exists).
297. See MILGRIM, supra note 39, 55 1.03-1.04.
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Providing a registry in which trade secret holders can secretly catalogue
valuable secrets would assist trade secret holders in demonstrating the first
two elements of a trade secret. Registration would assist courts and other
decision makers in analyzing the contours of the secret that the owner
considered valuable enough to protect. Registration would also provide
prima facie evidence of intent to protect a trade secret. One accused of
misappropriation could then bring forth proof that either (1) the registered
secret was well-known, or (2) the registrant had not demonstrated reasonable
efforts to protect her secret. Absent such a showing, courts would assume
that the registered secret was a reasonably protected secret invention.
The second benefit of a trade secret registry would be increased
protection against independent patenting of the invention. As described in
Section IV.C.1, supra, inventors who elect to commercialize their inventions
in secret risk the loss of two rights: the right to eventually patent the
invention and the right to practice the invention.298 Both right losses
potentially occur when a second party patents the invention.
The existence of a trade secret registry along with the establishment of
legal protection for prior users would assist trade secret users in protecting
against these losses. Adopting prior user rights, as urged in Section IV.C.1.a,
supra, could lead to protracted legal battles about whether an invention was
invented by a first inventor prior to patenting by a second. Registration
would alleviate some of the difficulties in proving prior use and protect
against false allegations of prior use. In fact, prior user rights could be
extended only to those inventions that have been registered, including
equivalents and obvious extensions.
Creating this registration regime would not be prohibitively expensive
because registration does not require the same level of examination as
patenting. Furthermore the PTO already has a statutorily authorized
registration system. Section 157 of Title 35 authorizes the PTO to establish a
statutory invention registration that requires applicants to give up future
rights to a patent on the invention after publication of the application. 299 The
statutory invention registration allows inventors to publish inventions that
they do not intend to patent in a manner that precludes others from
patenting the invention. The registration is used by inventors who do not
desire a patent but want to prevent others from patenting.
Establishing prior user rights may disincline inventors from using the
current registration system because they would no longer be at risk of losing

298. See spra Section IV.C.1.
299. 35 U.S.C. § 157(a)(3), (b) (2006).
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the right to practice to a second inventor patentee. However, they may desire
some means of demonstrating their prior use before an infringement action
arises. Such non-public registration would not serve as prior art as the
current registration does, because submissions would not be made public.
However, registration would serve as prima facie evidence of prior invention
and prior user rights.0
V.

CONCLUSION

Patent law has long relied on the perceived wisdom that patenting is
preferable to secrecy. This Article turns that logic on its head. Reliance on
secrecy can have numerous underappreciated social benefits,. including
targeted disclosure, more rapid commercialization, and increased incentives
to invent. Many of these benefits are the result of the competition-enhancing
aspects of trade secrets and the lack of barriers to innovative entry.
The framework developed in this Article leads to two primary policy
results. First, the legal system should not discourage the use of trade secrecy;
rational inventors will select trade secret protection only in instances when it
is also socially optimal without interference from policy makers. To eliminate
the disincentives to rely on secrecy that exist in current law, this Article
suggests establishing prior user rights and altering the standards for patent
priority disputes.
Second, the secrecy framework that this Article has developed suggests
that in certain circumstances secrecy should be encouraged. Without
intervention from policy makers, patents will be the preferred method of
protection more often than is socially desirable. The use of trade secrets
should be encouraged when both secrecy and patenting provide sufficient
incentives to invent. In such situations, the use of trade secrecy is socially
preferable because identical amounts of innovation are produced but with
fewer legal restrictions on competition. Furthermore, the fundamental
economic concern of patent law's reward theory-free riders-is
inapplicable in such cases.
Trade secrets can promote innovation. They do so in a limited set of
cases, but they do so without many of the drawbacks associated with patents.
Trade secrets have traditionally not been viewed as a means of incentivizing

300. The current publication requirement in the registration system would dissuade
trade secret holders from registration. See § 157(b), (c). In order to alleviate this, the statute
authorizing the invention registration would need to be altered to grant registrants the
option of non-publication.

978

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26:917

innovation or a means of encouraging inventors to refrain from patenting.
Courts and policy makers should, however, view secrecy as a low-cost means
of encouraging competition and innovation.

